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Overview 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a severe and complex disorder, historically 
believed to be ‘untreatable’. This view has been challenged through the success of 
various therapies in enabling individuals with this diagnosis to create ‘a life worth 
living’. However despite this progress little is known about how or why these 
treatments work. This thesis aims to contribute to this understanding through 
exploring the role of mentalization in BPD. 
Part 1 is a literature review which critically assesses studies investigating the 
processes that potentially underlie therapeutic change in BPD treatments. It reveals 
a lack of any research meeting the criteria for concluding a component of therapy a 
mechanism of change, but finds evidence for a link between therapeutic alliance and 
clinical outcome. One suggested explanation for this finding is the development of 
mentalization within a secure therapeutic relationship.  
Part 2 is an empirical research paper which further explores the contribution of 
mentalization to BPD. It investigates whether symptom severity in BPD is associated 
with performance on a battery of tasks measuring different dimensions of 
mentalizing ability. It also explores whether the current sample share similar 
impairments in mentalizing to participants in a previous study (Newbury-Helps,2011) 
with a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). The results contradicted 
hypotheses, finding no evidence for a relationship between BPD severity and 
mentalizing impairments, and revealing significant differences between mentalizing 
in BPD and ASPD samples. Possible reasons for these findings are discussed, 
along with their implications for future clinical practice and research. This study was 
conducted as part of a joint project (Perera, 2012). 
 
Part 3 critically appraises this work. The experience of developing and conducting 
the thesis is examined and retrospective improvements to the study are suggested, 
along with ideas for future research, in light of the practical and personal challenges 
encountered throughout the process.  
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Abstract 
Aims 
Despite growing evidence that many therapies are effective in treating borderline 
personality disorder (BPD), little is known about how or why. This review assesses 
studies that investigate the processes that could underlie therapeutic change in 
these treatments.  
Method 
A search was conducted to identify studies measuring potential mediators or 
mechanisms of change during or following treatment for BPD. 
Results 
358 references were identified, of which 10 met inclusion criteria. Reference lists 
revealed two further studies consistent with these limits. A total of 12 studies were 
reviewed.  
Conclusions 
No studies met criteria for concluding a component of therapy a mechanism of 
change in the treatment of BPD. Associations between aspects of different therapies 
and clinical outcomes have begun to be revealed however. Several studies found a 
relationship between therapeutic alliance and clinical outcome. It is recommended 
that future research focuses on understanding how this relationship leads to 
therapeutic change. 
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Introduction 
In 1938 Stern described a group of patients he found difficult to classify and treat as 
lying on the ‘border line’ of psychosis and neurosis. Since the inception of this term, 
both its definition as a mild form of schizophrenia and its perception as untreatable 
have been challenged. Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is now recognised as a 
distinct psychiatric diagnosis, affecting 0.7% of the general population (Coid, Yang, 
Tyrer, Roberts, & Ullrich, 2006). It is characterised by a pervasive pattern of 
instability, manifested through emotional dysregulation, poor impulse control, 
unstable and intense relationships with others and identity disturbance (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). These symptoms are associated with significant 
social and occupational impairment and an increased suicide mortality rate, 50 times 
that of the general population (Skodol et al., 2002). 
Historically, since Stern’s grave prognosis, a sense of therapeutic nihilism has 
surrounded the diagnosis.  Over time though this view has begun to shift as various 
psychological therapies have been developed and found effective in treating BPD. 
As Clarkin and Levy (2006) recognised however, while there is growing evidence 
that therapies, both cognitive behavioural and psychodynamic, can successfully 
treat BPD, little is known about how or why. 
The processes that create change in therapy are known as ‘mechanisms of change’, 
and the aspects of treatment that lead to these are termed ‘active ingredients’. It is 
important to investigate these for several reasons. Firstly, understanding what 
underlies therapeutic change can help bring order to what Kazdin (2007) referred to 
as an ‘embarrassing wealth of treatments in use’ (pp.3-4). He explained that it is 
likely that common change mechanisms are at work across various treatment 
modalities and that discovering this could therefore lead to a more integrative 
approach. Livesley (2005) echoed this view, proposing a framework for treating 
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personality disorder that draws together ideas from various models while focusing 
primarily on the nonspecific aspects of therapy, particularly the development and 
maintenance of a collaborative relationship. Further, knowing what elements of an 
intervention cause change allows us to optimise treatment effectiveness through 
developing and enhancing these aspects of therapy and discarding the components 
that do not contribute towards this outcome. Finally, mechanism of change research 
can give clues as to possible moderators of treatment effectiveness, helping 
therapists more accurately predict who will benefit from different treatments. This is 
particularly important in the study of BPD where ‘the experience for individuals who 
meet criteria … and their treatment providers has historically been a discouraging 
path of recurrent treatment failures despite their best efforts’ (Koerner, & Dimeff, 
2007,p.2). 
The first step in investigating mechanisms of change is often to identify mediators. 
Mediators are components that statistically account for the relationship between an 
independent variable (in this case treatment) and a dependent variable (treatment 
outcome or therapeutic change). Kraemer, Wilson, Fairburn and Agras (2002) 
referred to these as ‘potential mechanisms’, explaining that ‘all mechanisms are 
mediators but not all mediators are mechanisms’ (p.878). Kazdin (2007) described 
the difference in terms of specificity, mediators revealing a relationship between an 
aspect of an intervention and its results while mechanisms elucidate precisely how 
this change occurs. 
To demonstrate either effectively, Kazdin (2007) listed several criteria that must be 
met by studies: 
(1) a strong statistical association must be demonstrated between the 
intervention and the proposed change mechanism, and also between this 
mechanism and treatment outcome. 
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(2) other plausible mechanisms should not contribute towards therapeutic 
change. While there can be more than one mediator Kazdin suggested that 
demonstrating specificity strengthens the hypothesis that the mechanism 
proposed does mediate change.  
(3) evidence of mediation should be replicated across various studies, samples 
and conditions.  
(4) it must be proven that the mechanisms act before change occurs. Kazdin 
highlighted that many studies fail to demonstrate this causal relationship.  
(5) increased activation of the hypothesised mediator should predict greater 
therapeutic change. 
(6) there should be a theoretically plausible explanation as to how this 
mechanism might exert its effect on therapeutic outcome.  
Ahn and Wampold (2001) recognised this as a complex task and suggested that 
component studies are ‘closest to the “gold standard” of experimental designs’ 
(p.251) in proving the effect of a specific ingredient on therapeutic outcome. These 
studies compare treatment with and without the components of therapy believed to 
be responsible for change. This can be achieved by either dismantling the 
treatment, leaving out the proposed mechanism, or by adding that component to an 
existing treatment.  
The aim of this review is to evaluate current evidence regarding potential mediators 
and mechanisms of change in effective treatments of BPD.  For the purposes of this 
paper, these are interventions which have been proved effective in randomised 
controlled trials. To date, these are cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT: Davidson et 
al., 2006), dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT: Linehan et al., 2006), schema 
focused therapy (SFT: Giesen-Bloo et al., 2006), transference-focused 
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psychotherapy (TFP: Giesen-Bloo et al., 2006) and mentalization-based treatment 
(MBT: Bateman, & Fonagy, 2008). This topic was explored in a special issue of the 
Journal of Clinical Psychology (2006), however at this time most answers were 
theoretical rather than empirically tested, or drew conclusions from research that did 
not meet Kazdin’s (2007) first assumption of statistical association. This review will 
investigate how much closer we are today to identifying and understanding the 
processes that underlie therapeutic change in BPD. 
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Method 
Inclusion criteria 
Studies were included in this review if they meet the following criteria: 
(1) participants were over 18 
(2) participants had a diagnosis of BPD or BPD traits 
 (3) participants received one of the therapeutic interventions under review: CBT, 
DBT, MBT, SFT or TFP 
(4) a potential mediator or mechanism of therapeutic change was measured during, 
or following, the intervention, 
or participants were asked which aspects of therapy they found effective.  
Literature search  
Relevant papers were identified initially by searching electronic databases 
(PsycINFO, MEDLINE and EMBASE) using the following phrase: (Borderline 
Personality Disorder or bpd) AND ((cognitive adj2 therapy) OR (cbt)) OR ((dialectic* 
behavio?r therapy) OR (dbt)) OR ((mentalization based therapy) OR (mentalization 
based treatment) OR (mbt)) OR ((schema adj2 therapy) OR (sft)) OR ((transference 
focused psychotherapy) OR (tfp)) AND ((Psychotherapeutic Processes or 
mechanism* of change) OR (mechanism* of action) OR (mediat*) OR (moderat*) 
OR (active ingredient)). 
  
9 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of studies shortlisted for review. 
Study Sample 
size 
Treatment Proposed 
Mechanism of 
change 
Statistical 
Analysis 
Method 
Findings related to this review 
 
Diamond, 
Stovall-
McClough, 
Clarkin and 
Levy (2003) 
 
10 
 
TFP 
 
Reflective 
function within 
the patient-
therapist 
attachment  
 
N/A 
 
 most clients in the study showed increased reflective 
function and improvements in behaviour, 
symptomatology and attachment status 
 clients demonstrating the smallest shifts in attachment 
varied noticeably from the therapist in reflective function 
measures 
 
 
Perseius, 
Öjehagen, 
Åsberg, Ekdahl 
and Samuelson 
(2003) 
 
14 
 
DBT 
 
- 
 
Qualitative 
content 
analysis 
 
 clients and therapists both reported that respect within 
the therapeutic relationship and shared responsibility are 
effective components of DBT 
 both clients and therapists found the therapy contract 
supportive and appreciated the method of DBT 
 clients found group therapy and telephone consultation 
helpful  
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Cunningham, 
Wolbert and 
Lillie (2004) 
14 DBT - Qualitative 
analysis 
 clients found individual therapy most effective where they 
valued their relationship with their therapist and felt they 
were treated as an equal 
 achieving a balance between acceptance and change 
was experienced as helpful in individual therapy 
 respondents found skills training most useful when the 
facilitators had a large knowledge base 
 interviewees highlighted how gaining control over their 
emotions had positively changed their lives 
 participants found that some DBT skills  were difficult to 
learn and also expressed a wish for more validation in 
skills coaching 
 
 
Levy, Meehan et 
al. (2006) 
 
90 
 
TFP,  
DBT & SPT 
 
Attachment 
pattern and 
reflective 
function 
 
ANOVA, t-
tests and 
McNemar’s 
test  
 
 reflective function and narrative coherence increased as 
a function of treatment with TFP 
 clients receiving TFP showed significant changes in 
attachment security 
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Wenzel, 
Chapman, 
Newman, Beck 
and Brown 
(2006) 
19 
 
CBT Change in 
dysfunctional 
beliefs 
Paired and 
independent 
samples t-
tests 
 measures of dysfunctional beliefs decreased significantly 
between baseline and treatment termination and 
baseline and follow-up but not between treatment 
termination and follow up 
 at follow-up there was no significant difference between 
dysfunctional belief scores in treatment responders and 
nonresponders 
 
 
27 
 
Reduction in 
hopelessness 
 
Paired and 
independent 
samples t-test 
 
 measures of hopelessness decreased significantly 
between baseline and treatment termination, baseline 
and follow-up and treatment termination and follow up 
 at follow-up there was no significant difference between 
hopelessness scores in treatment responders and 
nonresponders 
 
 
Davidson, 
Livingstone, 
McArthur, 
Dickson and 
Gumley (2007) 
 
10 
 
CBT 
 
Integrative 
complexity  
 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
test 
 
 good outcome in CBT was not associated with changes 
in integrative complexity between early and late sessions 
 therapist integrative complexity was in fact found to 
increase where clients showed a poor outcome 
 increased integrative complexity was however related 
with improved social functioning  
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Dewe and 
Krawitz (2007) 
19 DBT DBT skills use T-tests  clients reported experiencing ‘What good are emotions?’ 
as the most useful skill taught in DBT, followed by 
‘Factors reducing interpersonal effectiveness’ and 
‘Options for intensity of asking or saying no’ 
 11 skills were rated as significantly less helpful than 
‘What good are emotions?’ 
 of these less useful skills, the majority were taught in the 
distress tolerance module  
 
Spinhoven, 
Giesen-Bloo, 
van Dyck, 
Koolman and 
Arntz (2007) 
 
54 
 
SFT & TFP 
 
Therapeutic 
alliance 
 
Hierarchical 
regression  
 
 early changes in client perception of the therapeutic 
alliance had a significant relationship with later changes 
in BPD symptoms 
 early therapist ratings of the therapeutic alliance 
predicted premature termination of treatment 
 later ratings of therapeutic alliance by both clients and 
therapists predicted time to treatment dropout 
 
Stepp, Epler, 
Jhang and Trull 
(2008)  
27 DBT DBT skills use Multilevel 
modelling 
 increased  DBT skills use showed a significant 
association with decreased borderline features 
 overall skills use was associated with improvements in 
scores of  affective instability, negative relationships and 
identity disturbance 
 reduced identity disturbance scores were predicted by 
the use of mindfulness and emotion regulation skills 
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Davenport, Bore 
and Campbell 
(2010) 
17 DBT Self-control Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
test and 
Kruskal-
Wallis test 
 the pre-treatment sample scored lower on measures of 
self-control, agreeableness and conscientiousness than 
norms, and higher on neuroticism 
 post-treatment respondents only scored differently from 
norms on measures of neuroticism which were elevated 
 pre-treatment group scores were significantly lower than 
post-treatment on self-control, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness 
 
Neacsiu, Rizvi 
and Linehan 
(2010) 
108 DBT DBT skills use Hierarchical 
linear 
modelling 
 DBT skills use fully mediated decreases in suicide 
attempts, depression and improved anger control over 
time 
 skills use partially mediated the association between 
decreased self-injury and time in treatment 
 use of DBT skills was not found to mediate anger 
expression or suppression 
 
 
Axelrod, 
Perepletchikova, 
Holtzman and 
Sinha (2011) 
 
27 
 
DBT 
 
Emotion 
regulation  
 
ANOVA 
 
 emotional regulation and mood increased significantly 
over time while substance use decreased 
 changes in substance use were explained by increased 
emotional regulation (not improved mood) 
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Results 
Limiting results to journal articles in English published in the last 10 years, the 
search identified a total of 331 studies for review. Of these, 10 met inclusion criteria. 
Two further studies that met inclusion criteria were found in the references of these 
papers, giving a total of 12 studies for review. These are listed in Table 1, along with 
their characteristics.   
In presenting the results of this review, the theoretical background and practical 
application of each therapy is described and evidence regarding their potential 
mechanisms of change is evaluated. The search did not identify any studies 
empirically investigating mechanisms of change underlying the effectiveness of 
MBT. This treatment is therefore not included in this review. 
Cognitive behaviour therapy 
CBT posits that dysfunctional schemas underlie personality disorder symptoms. 
Schemas are cognitive structures that determine how we interpret events and make 
sense of ourselves, others, the world and our future, given our early experiences 
and their interaction with our genetic predispositions. Schemas bias which aspects 
of our experiences we notice, attend to and remember and distort or discount 
contradictory evidence. Those with a diagnosis of BPD commonly hold the beliefs 
‘the world is dangerous and malevolent’, ‘I am powerless and vulnerable’ and ‘I am 
inherently unacceptable’ (Beck, Freeman, Davis et al., 2004). Unhelpful behaviours 
are understood as responses that were adaptive when they were developed, but 
have become dysfunctional and self-defeating in new environments where the same 
threats are not present. The combination of beliefs held in BPD can lead to the 
activation of contradictory behavioural strategies to survive, clinging to others for 
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protection and pushing them away through distrust. This frightening experience 
leads to the intense emotional arousal and weak sense of self that define BPD. 
This understanding is used to develop a therapeutic relationship with clients and to 
collaboratively build a formulation of their difficulties. Davidson (2008) described this 
as the ‘most important therapeutic tool’ (p.39) in cognitive therapy, giving clients the 
chance, maybe for the first time, to begin to make sense of why they feel the way 
they do in a non-blaming way. Listening to this formulation in itself, she suggested, 
can reduce self-harm. It is also used to guide therapy which focuses on exploring 
how helpful negative beliefs are in current circumstances and aims to shift them to 
be less absolute with the goal of improving quality of life. This can be achieved 
through strategies such as behavioural experiments testing the reality of 
dysfunctional beliefs, worksheets looking for evidence against these and supporting 
more adaptive thoughts, or through imagery, where clients recall and manipulate 
distressing memories. Unhelpful behaviours are addressed through practising skills 
such as relaxation, assertiveness and problem solving.  
In a review article, Wenzel, Chapman, Newman, Beck and Brown (2006) looked at 
evidence for several potential mechanisms of change promoted by the cognitive 
theory of BPD. They hypothesised that of primary importance in improving BPD 
symptoms is the modification of dysfunctional core beliefs. To support this they 
presented new evidence from an open clinical trial (Brown, Newman, Charlesworth, 
Crits-Cristoph, & Beck, 2004, cited in Wenzel et al., 2006) of CBT for BPD. 
Participants in the trial completed the BPD scale of the Personality Beliefs 
Questionnaire (PBQ-BPD; Butler, Brown, Beck, & Grisham, 2002) at baseline 
(n=27), treatment termination (n=25) and 18 month follow-up (n=19), rating the 
extent to which they endorsed various negative beliefs. These scores reduced 
significantly from baseline to termination and baseline to follow-up but not between 
16 
 
termination and follow-up. Exploring the changes in endorsement of individual items, 
the greatest reductions were found in statements regarding the self, particularly ‘If 
people get close to me, they will discover the “real” me and reject me’. Smaller 
reductions were seen in negative beliefs about others, for example ‘People will take 
advantage of me if I give them the chance’.  Participants who presented at follow-up 
with less than five BPD criteria according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) were classified 
as treatment responders (n=15). Comparing change in PBQ scores in this group to 
that in nonresponders (n=4) found only a non-significant difference. The authors 
reported a large effect size (d = -0.99), suggesting that the study may simply have 
lacked power due to the small n. Given the group sample size of 4 however it might 
have been more appropriate to explore these changes using qualitative methods. A 
larger study is therefore required to test the link between modification of 
dysfunctional beliefs and clinical outcome in BPD. Further, this study does not 
determine a timeline of changes so it is possible that the change in BPD symptoms 
preceded belief change. Reductions in behaviours such as alcohol use and making 
threats for example could have led to new experiences of the self and others that 
challenged these beliefs. 
Davidson, Livingstone, McArthur, Dickson and Gumley (2007) hypothesised that a 
change in cognitive style rather than cognitions themselves would predict outcomes 
of CBT for clients with a diagnosis of BPD. They used integrative complexity (IC) to 
test this prediction. IC is a measure of the cognitive style individuals and groups use 
in processing information, solving problems and making decisions. Complexity 
requires the recognition and acceptance of multiple valid perspectives, and also the 
integration of these, appreciating the connections between different, sometimes 
contradictory, views (Seudfeld, Tetlock, & Streufert, 1992). It can be measured from 
verbal material, by splitting data into segments that relate to one idea and scoring 
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the IC of each unit from 1 (low differentiation and low integration) up to 7 (high 
differentiation and high integration). Low levels of IC have been linked to inflexible 
and simplistic attitudes and perceptions (Seudfeld, Tetlock, & Streufert, 1992) and 
also to symptoms characteristic of BPD, including deliberate self-harm (Patsiokas, 
Clum, & Luscomb, 1979) and aggressive behaviour (Bruch, McCAnn, & Harvey, 
1991). This rigid style of thinking is something that is challenged through CBT.  
To test whether changes in IC mediate therapeutic change Davidson et al. (2007) 
coded transcripts from two sessions (one early in therapy and one late) with five 
clients with good outcomes and five with poor outcomes. Outcome was determined 
by number of suicide attempts, and then by reduction in depression across therapy, 
measured using the Beck Depression Inventory-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). 
They predicted that clients with a good therapeutic outcome, and their therapists, 
would show a greater increase in IC over time. This relationship was not confirmed 
however. In fact the reverse trend was found in therapists, who showed significantly 
enhanced IC in later sessions where clients’ outcomes were poor. 
Further, no significant association was found between mean changes in IC scores 
over therapy and changes in measures of anxiety, depression, dysfunctional beliefs 
or items endorsed in the Brief Symptom Inventory (Derogatis, 1993). Changes were 
associated with improved score on social functioning, measured by the Social 
Functioning Questionnaire (Tyrer et al., 2005). However correlational studies cannot 
determine causality; it is equally plausible that an increase in social functioning 
could enhance IC as spending time with others will increase exposure to different 
ideas and perspectives which can become integrated into thinking.  
Its conclusions are also limited by the range of sessions analysed. The transcripts 
labelled ‘early in therapy’ were taken from between the first and tenth session. 
Davidson (2008) suggests however that by session 10 the therapist should have 
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developed and shared with their client a formulation of their difficulties. Given the 
importance of this aspect of therapy it might have been more appropriate to only 
class sessions as ‘early’ pre-formulation otherwise changes could already have 
begun to occur in different areas of the client’s presentation, including the IC of their 
discourse. Finally, this study used a technique that had not previously been applied 
in this context. IC is typically used to analyse ideas expressed in essays and 
speeches rather than natural discourse, and the authors described the problems 
that they encountered in coding this material. IC could not be scored in 45 – 80% of 
the interactions in sessions, for example where the therapist and client interrupted 
each other. It is possible therefore that the IC levels did not accurately reflect the 
complexity of the reasoning underlying the therapeutic discourse. The relationship 
between this measure and social functioning could be understood as IC becoming 
more obvious (and therefore more easily scored) with increased social functioning, 
participants developing their ability to express their thoughts as they spend more 
time interacting with others.   
Turning back now to Wenzel et al.’s (2006) review, participants in the clinical trial 
were asked to complete the Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1989), 
again at intake (n=29), treatment termination (n=29) and follow-up 18 months later 
(n=27) , to investigate the plausibility of reduction of hopelessness as an active 
ingredient in CBT. Significant reductions in scores on this scale were found between 
intake and termination, intake and follow-up and termination and follow-up. 
Comparing follow-up hopelessness scores in treatment responders (n=22) and 
nonresponders (n=5) however revealed a difference that was non-significant. 
Wenzel et al. (2006) also investigated whether improvements in attitude towards 
treatment may act as a mechanism of therapeutic change in CBT. 29 participants in 
the trial were classified as having a positive or negative attitude towards treatment 
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according to their response to the question ‘What is your attitude toward talking with 
a therapist/counsellor as treatment for your problem?’, part of the Attitudes and 
Expectations Questionnaire (AAE; adapted from Elkin at el., 1989). Attitudes were 
classed as positive if participants responded between 1 and 3, and negative 
between 4 and 7 (where 1 was ‘very positive’ and 7 ‘very negative’). After 12 months 
of CBT, 66.7% of those with a positive attitude towards treatment no longer met 
BPD criteria, while only 14.3% of those with a negative attitude showed the same 
outcome. To prove mediation however an association must be demonstrated 
between the intervention and the mechanism of change, in this case treatment 
attitude. Unlike the previous studies reviewed, this does not measure improvement 
in treatment attitude so cannot conclude mediation, but does suggest that treatment 
attitudes may moderate the outcome of CBT, influencing the effect of the 
intervention. Further, the severity of participant’s symptomatology at assessment is 
not reported in this paper. It is possible that this was lower in those with more 
positive attitudes and that relatively smaller changes would therefore allow them to 
no longer meet BPD criteria.   
In summary, studies have attempted to ascertain whether therapeutic change in 
CBT can be attributed to changes in beliefs, attitudes and thinking style. While some 
have found these to improve over therapy, others have revealed the opposite, and 
none have found an association between these changes and those achieved over 
therapy. This is not to say that these components do not play a role in effecting 
therapeutic change, but suggests that future research needs to employ larger 
sample sizes and develop more valid measures of complex cognitive features. 
Dialectical behaviour therapy 
DBT is based on Linehan’s (1993) biopsychosocial theory which defines BPD as 
primarily a dysfunction of the emotional regulation system. It is hypothesized that the 
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emotional system in individuals diagnosed with BPD responds with greater than 
average speed and sensitivity to stimuli. This causes intense arousal which inhibits 
cognitive processing systems underlying skills needed to manage such experiences, 
such as problem solving and recalling previous coping. This dysfunction is 
understood to be a result of the interaction and transaction between biological 
vulnerability and exposure to an invalidating environment. In such an environment 
individuals’ internal experiences are punished, denied or ignored, leaving them 
unable to understand their emotions, let alone learn how to express or moderate 
them. It can also lead individuals to invalidate their own emotional experiences.  In 
this model the characteristic features of BPD are therefore seen as both a 
consequence of, and also a means of coping with or escaping the extreme 
emotional arousal and confusion they experience. Linehan also highlighted how the 
environment can continue to reinforce the maladaptive behaviours that individuals 
have developed to cope with their distress and block the use of more protective 
skills. 
DBT aims to enhance emotional regulation with the ultimate goal of helping clients 
to build ‘a life worth living’ (McMain, Korman, & Dimeff, 2001). It uses a combination 
of techniques from behaviour therapy and mindfulness and is underpinned by the 
theory of dialectics. This proposes that reality is interrelated, composed of opposing 
forces and constantly changing. The fundamental dialectic underlying DBT is that of 
acceptance and change (Dimeff, & Linehan, 2001). The therapy achieves a balance 
between these two states, validating clients’ experiences whist teaching strategies 
to moderate their emotions.  
There are several modes of treatment in DBT. At skills training groups clients learn 
and practise skills in mindfulness, emotional regulation, distress tolerance, and 
interpersonal effectiveness. In individual sessions these can be related to clients’ 
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personal goals and rehearsed with their personal therapist. Sessions also focus on 
enhancing motivation and commitment to therapy. Between sessions therapists are 
available to clients through telephone contact to generalize their learning to their 
lives outside of therapy. Clients can call in times of crisis to identify skills they can 
use and how to put these into practice. Finally, therapists attend a weekly 
consultation meeting where together they enhance their skills and motivation.  A 
final aspect of DBT involves shaping the environment around clients to reinforce 
their use of newly developed skills, for example through consultation with those 
around them, professionally or socially (Feigenbaum, 2007). 
Given DBT’s conceptualization of BPD as a disorder of emotional regulation, 
Axelrod, Perepletchikova, Holtzman and Sinha (2011) investigated whether 
improvements in this area could account for decreased substance use in individuals 
with this diagnosis. Participants (n = 23, all female) had a diagnosis of BPD and 
substance dependence and attended a 20 week DBT programme. Their emotional 
regulation and substance use were measured at three points throughout therapy 
(baseline, mid treatment and end of treatment) using the Difficulties in Emotion 
Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz, & Roemer, 2004) and a combination of self-report, 
clinician assessment, collateral information and urine toxicology screening or 
breathalyser tests.  The study revealed a significant reduction in both DERS scores 
and substance use over time. There was a significant interaction between the two, 
changes in substance use becoming non-significant when enhanced emotional 
regulation was controlled for. The strength of this result is also enhanced by its 
demonstration of specificity; Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, 
Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) scores showed an increase in mood over time but this was 
not significantly associated with reduced substance use.   
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Linehan has led studies investigating the effectiveness of DBT adapted for 
substance users, comparing it to treatment as usual for women with a diagnosis of 
both BPD and substance dependence (Linehan et al., 1999) and to comprehensive 
validation therapy with a 12-step program for heroin-dependent women with a 
diagnosis of BPD (Linehan et al., 2002) . In both studies, participants receiving DBT 
showed significant reductions in substance use as well as improvements in 
psychological functioning. Verheul et al. (2003) conducted a randomised trial 
comparing treatment as usual and DBT in treating participants with a BPD 
diagnosis, including those with substance use disorders. They found that, even 
without Linehan’s modifications, DBT resulted in greater reductions in alcohol use 
than treatment as usual. This study however reveals a specific link between reduced 
substance use and improved emotional regulation, encouraging further investigation 
into this as a potential mechanism for change in DBT.   
Testing treatment outcomes (substance use and depression) and putative mediators 
of change (emotional regulation) at these three different time points offers a chance 
to evaluate the sequence of these changes. However, with both substance use and 
emotional regulation showing a significant increase from baseline to mid treatment 
and from mid treatment to end of treatment it is still impossible to know which 
change preceded the other: maybe using alcohol or drugs less frequently increased 
participants’ emotional regulation, or a different factor accounted for the change in 
both.  
Testing a similar hypothesis, Davenport, Bore and Campbell (2010) investigated 
whether decreased dysfunction, measured by scores on the International 
Personality Item Pool inventory (Goldberg, 1999), was associated with enhanced 
self-control, measured by a self-control questionnaire developed by Tangney, 
Baumeister and Boone (2004). This asks participants to rate on a 5 point scale how 
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‘like me’ different statements are, for example ‘I’d be better off if I stopped to think 
before acting’. The questionnaires were sent to two groups of participants: the first, 
their control condition, were on the waiting list or had started the 14 month DBT 
programme within the last eight weeks (n = 7), and the second had graduated from 
this programme within the past three years (n = 10). Further therapy received by 
those in this treatment condition was not reported. A comparison of the means of 
these constructs in pre and post-treatment samples to norms, revealed significantly 
lowered self-control, agreeableness and conscientiousness, and higher neuroticism 
in the pre-treatment group. DBT graduates only differed significantly from the norm 
in neuroticism which was still elevated. Comparing the scores of both groups it was 
revealed that pre-treatment respondents scored lower than those post-treatment in 
self-control, agreeableness and conscientiousness. Davenport et al. (2010) 
concluded that these results support their prediction that self-control is developed 
through DBT and demonstrate a link between this and borderline presentation, 
specifically an increased level of agreeableness and conscientiousness. 
No measures of BPD symptoms were employed in this study however, reducing its 
reliability. It is possible that participants reported enhanced self-control whilst feeling 
and acting in a way that did not reflect this. This could have been more accurately 
represented by measuring the frequency of emotions and behaviours that indicate 
low levels of self-control, such as impulsive behaviours, rather than asking 
participants for more subjective representations of this potential mediator. Further it 
cannot be established from this study that the link between enhanced reported self-
control and improved functioning is causal, given that the design is between-
subjects rather than within-subjects. Davenport et al.’s inclusion criteria could also 
confound results; over eight weeks of treatment changes in self-control could 
already be occurring in participants who made up the pre-treatment group. Similarly, 
given three years, the heightened levels of self-control, agreeableness and 
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conscientiousness found in post-treatment participants could reflect spontaneous 
remission rather than therapeutic benefits. Finally, the self-selection of participants 
could have biased results, those who return the postal questionnaire possibly having 
different experiences of therapy, and maybe different personality traits, to those who 
did not respond. 
The use of DBT skills has also been explored as a potential mechanism of change. 
Neacsiu, Rizvi and Linehan (2010) investigated how this mediates treatment 
outcome, measured by scores on the Suicide Attempt and Self-Injury Interview 
(Linehan, Comtois, Brown, Heard & Wagner, 2006), Hamilton Rating Scale for 
Depression (Hamilton, 1960) and State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory 
(Spielberger, 1988). Women with a diagnosis of BPD were allocated to either DBT 
(n = 54) or a control treatment (community treatment by experts, treatment as usual 
or comprehensive validation therapy with a 12-step program, n = 54). They each 
completed these measures and the DBT Ways of Coping Checklist (adapted from 
the Revised Ways of Coping Checklist, Vitaliano, Russo, Carr, Maiuro, & Becker, 
1985) at pre-treatment, and again after four, eight and twelve months of treatment 
and at a four month follow up. Although skills were employed by all participants 
about 50% of the time before they had begun treatment, their use was found only to 
increase significantly over time in participants assigned to the DBT condition. Given 
that there was evidence of skills use across all conditions, mediation analyses 
combined data from all participants. These revealed that the relationships between 
time in treatment and reduced probability of suicide attempts and improvements in 
depression and in anger control were each fully mediated by increased use of DBT 
skills. This factor also partially mediated the association between time in treatment 
and the increased likelihood of no self-injurious behaviours.   
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Neacsiu et al. (2010) acknowledged that retrospective bias could have led to 
inaccuracies in their collection of data regarding coping. They suggested that this 
factor is not expected to fluctuate over time though so will have been controlled for 
in their data analysis. This assumption can be questioned though, given that the 
self-report data was not collected just over time, but over time in treatment which 
might affect this bias. Schraedley, Turner and Gotlib (2002) for example highlighted 
the importance of controlling for depressive symptoms in interpreting retrospective 
reports, finding that these influenced the reporting of, particularly self-referential, 
information.  Improvements in depression over treatment could therefore be 
hypothesised to lead to increased reporting of DBT skills use. Further, as 
mediational analyses are correlational, it could be proposed that improvements in 
depression mediate not just an increase in reporting DBT skills, but in their use. It is 
plausible that reductions in suicidality, depression and anger control could enable 
participants to use skills more often, or that another factor influences both the use of 
DBT skills use and these outcomes.  
Stepp, Epler, Jhang and Trull (2008) tested a similar hypothesis that DBT skills use 
would predict a reduction in scores on the Personality Assessment Inventory – 
Borderline Features Scale (PAI- BOR; Moorey, 1991). Twenty-seven participants 
meeting DSM-IV criteria for BPD, or above the PAI-BOR threshold for BPD features, 
took part in the study. Participants completed the PAI-BOR at the start of each DBT 
skills module and kept daily diary cards, recording whether or not they used each of 
22 skills, throughout treatment. This study found skills use to increase over time and 
PAI-BOR scores to decrease, and further that these variables were significantly 
associated. Analysing individual symptom subscales, Stepp et al. found that overall 
skills use was associated with improvements in affective instability, negative 
relationships and identity disturbance, but not self-harm. Reduced identity 
disturbance was predicted by the use of mindfulness and emotion regulation skills, 
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but no other significant associations were found between specific skills sets from 
individual modules and subscale outcomes.  
Stepp et al.’s (2008) conclusions, like Neacsiu et al.’s (2010), rely on self-report data 
which can be biased, and are also drawn from correlations. Stepp et al. (2008) 
proposed that motivation may have acted as an extraneous variable influencing both 
skills use and treatment outcomes. As a solution to this they controlled for diary card 
compliance in their analyses, dividing number of completed diary cards by number 
of weeks spent in therapy for a measure of motivation. It is possible however that 
motivation (and card compliance) does not remain constant throughout treatment. 
West’s (2007) PRIME theory suggests that motivation, rather than being a stable 
factor, is fluid and highly dynamic.  Further, DBT aims to enhance client motivation 
so it is unlikely that this will be accurately recorded through a cumulative measure of 
diary card compliance across therapy. There are also many other factors besides 
motivation which could equally have affected participants’ skills use and PAI-BOR 
scores. 
Despite these limitations both studies do suggest a role of skills use in mediating 
treatment outcomes in DBT which may be a first step in establishing this as a 
mechanism of change. The papers show a consistent association between DBT and 
increased skills use as well as between skills use and measures of therapeutic 
change.  
Dewe and Krawitz (2007) asked clients what they found the most effective aspects 
of DBT skills training. Using a Likert-type scale, they asked 19 clients (17 with a 
diagnosis of BPD and 2 with clinically significant BPD traits) to rate the effectiveness 
of 27 skills they had learnt over a full course of DBT. The top rated skill was ‘What 
good are emotions?’, presented in the emotion regulation module. This teaches the 
importance of emotions, for example in communication, motivation, and self-
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validation. The next rated skills were ‘Factors reducing interpersonal effectiveness’ 
and ‘Options for intensity of asking or saying no’. These skills are taught in the 
interpersonal effectiveness modules and explore what can block the use of effective 
interpersonal skills such as worrying thoughts, difficult emotions or overpowering 
environments, and ways of judging how intensely you should make or refuse a 
request in different situations. The three skills rated lowest were all from the distress 
tolerance module which teaches skills to use when it is not possible or appropriate 
to change your situation or emotion. They are ‘concerned with tolerating and 
surviving crises and with accepting life as it is in the moment’ (Linehan, 2003, p. 96). 
While this study indicates which skills clients value in DBT, its timing, after 
completion of the course, could have biased opinions. The authors wondered 
whether different skills could be experienced as valuable at different points in the 
programme, for example, when recently learnt and so fresh in their mind, or taught 
earlier and so better practised. Participants’ perceptions of how effective skills are 
could also have been effected by how often they needed to use them. If a client was 
not experiencing crises often for example, they would not have much call to practise 
their distress tolerance skills but this is not to say that these skills are not effective in 
appropriate situations. Perhaps this could have been explored in the questionnaire, 
asking participants how effective they find each skill in different situations. Beyond 
these limitations, it is also important to know exactly what respondents meant when 
they rated a skill effective, for example how it helped them and in what ways things 
changed when they used it. 
Cunningham, Wolbert and Lillie (2004) looked for this richer data, asking clients 
what they found effective in DBT and why. They used semi structured interviews to 
explore the views of 14 women with a diagnosis of BPD who had been receiving 
DBT for between six months and three years. Transcripts of these interviews were 
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coded according to descriptive topics before authors conducted an interpretive 
analysis of the quotes from each topic, identifying common themes. Overall, 
participants felt that the quality of their relationship with their individual therapist and 
being treated as an equal, the ability of their therapist to successfully balance 
acceptance and change, the knowledge base of their skills trainers and a better 
ability to modulate their emotions were important in improving their day to day lives, 
relationships and hope. They further suggested that some aspects of the treatment 
were less helpful, including the difficulty in understanding and applying some of what 
they were taught in skills coaching. Participants also described how they thought 
telephone consultation would be more effective if they were offered more validation 
during these calls, confirmation that what they are feeling is understandable in that 
context. One participant told her interviewer ‘I wish that they would… tell me that 
things are going to be ok. I tend to get really ruffled and need to be soothed a little 
bit by somebody else’ (p.254).  
This highlights an important consideration to hold in mind when looking at the results 
of this study; what people want is not always what they need. The purpose of 
telephone consultation in DBT is not to soothe clients but to encourage appropriate 
help-seeking and receiving behaviour, to enhance skills generalization and to offer 
an opportunity to repair the therapeutic relationship following misunderstandings 
(Linehan, 1993).  In fact if clients receive more soothing in consultation this could 
reinforce crises and feelings of self-inefficacy. Koons (2011) described this process, 
explaining how ‘soothing’ calls, while comforting at the time, do not teach clients 
how to tolerate distress on their own and can therefore increase their use of 
unhelpful behaviours and their sense of being out of control. Williams (1998) too 
recognised in her own recovery from BPD that it is crucial for professionals 
sometimes to be ‘cruel to be kind’ (p.174). Participants might feel differently about 
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these issues given the length of time they have been receiving therapy. It would 
have been useful for such characteristics to have been included in the paper.   
Perseius, Öjehagen, Åsberg, Ekdahl and Samuelson (2003) too used interviews to 
investigate client perceptions of DBT and the components of therapy they found 
effective. Ten women who had been in DBT for 12 months or longer participated, 
and qualitative content analysis revealed that they found six aspects of treatment 
particularly important. These were: the respect, understanding and confirmation they 
felt from their therapists, DBT’s focus on problems and understanding these, its 
emphasis on the client’s responsibility within therapy and their lives, the contract, 
group skills training, and finally telephone coaching. Questionnaires and a group 
interview were also given to therapists who similarly valued the respect that DBT 
promotes for clients and their difficulties, the mutual responsibility taken by 
themselves and their clients and also their confidence in the model itself, which 
thoroughly prepared them for anything that may arise in therapy. 
Several of these factors are also hypothesized to be mechanisms of change in 
Lynch, Chapman, Rosenthal, Kuo and Linehan’s (2006) review of DBT. They 
proposed that skills training, the skill sets taught in DBT, telephone consultation, 
high levels of therapist self-disclosure and therapist reciprocal vulnerability 
potentially underlie therapeutic change. Reciprocal vulnerability is the willingness of 
therapists to allow themselves to be vulnerable in sessions through self-disclosure 
and accepting clients’ behaviours rather than struggling with them (Shearin & 
Linehan, 1993), important in building the relationships that both clients and 
therapists valued. It is difficult however to determine whether these aspects of DBT 
are simply components of therapy or in fact mechanisms underlying its success. To 
unpick this, further research would be required to operationalize these factors and 
demonstrate a relationship between their presence in therapy and therapeutic gain.  
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While both qualitative papers gave an impression of what clients felt helped them to 
progress in therapy it would have been useful to focus too on how they thought 
these things made a difference, linking what happens in therapy with changes 
outside. The participants in both studies also largely related very positive 
experiences of therapy while it could be valuable to explore further what people 
found less effective. Finally, neither study gave an explicit statement of the authors’ 
position beyond the fact that interviewers were not employed within the services 
from which they recruited. Elliott, Fischer and Rennie (1999) highlighted how 
important it is that authors own their perspective in qualitative research as this will 
inherently bias outcomes and should be held in mind while interpreting results. A 
control against this is to provide credibility checks. In Perseius et al.’s (2003) study 
two colleagues independently analysed the interviews and came together to reflect 
on their findings, but both were authors of the paper. Analysis in Cunningham et al.’s 
(2004) study was also collaborative between the authors. This suggests that their 
perspectives did not necessarily vary but were shared for the most part. Further, 
neither study checked back with respondents that their views were accurately 
expressed in the paper. Despite these considerations however it is striking that both 
studies found clients to describe their experience of being treated with respect in a 
collaborative therapeutic relationship as being a critical aspect of DBT.  
In summary, studies have revealed associations between therapeutic outcome in 
DBT and increased emotion regulation, enhanced self-control and the use of skills. 
These conclusions are reinforced by clients’ descriptions of how emotional 
regulation skills have improved their day to day lives. A further factor clients and 
therapists felt was a central component in DBT was the client-therapist relationship. 
Kazdin (2007) promoted caution in labelling this therapeutic alliance as a 
mechanism of change though, arguing the need for ‘next-step’ research that 
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explains how and why, identifying the specific aspects of this supportive relationship 
that promote or effect symptom change.  
Some suggest that the therapeutic alliance can effect therapeutic change in and of 
itself. Indeed, an investigation by Strupp and Hadley (1979) found no difference in 
outcomes between clients (including those with a borderline presentation) receiving 
treatment from highly experienced psychotherapists and college professors with no 
therapeutic experience, but an ability to develop understanding relationships. Others 
hypothesise however that although a therapeutic relationship may be a necessary 
ingredient in treatment, it is not sufficient to produce successful therapeutic 
outcomes (Gaston, 1990). Henry and Strupp (1994) presented the alliance as 
potentially important in both senses, explaining that it not only produces direct 
change, but creates a context within which change is possible. They describe the 
client-therapist relationship as providing a ‘gating function’ (p.80), inhibiting or 
enhancing the success of interventions and therefore mediating their effectiveness. 
It is impossible to determine which theory is supported by the studies reviewed here. 
Gaston (1990) explained that to do this specific hypotheses need to be tested, 
examining and controlling for other factors which could influence outcome such as 
the technical ability of the therapist.  
Schema focused therapy 
Schema therapy is an extension of CBT, incorporating techniques from object 
relations and gestalt therapy. Young (1990) suggested that the behaviours 
characteristic of BPD are driven by early maladaptive schemas, ‘self-defeating 
emotional and cognitive patterns that begin early in our development and repeat 
throughout life’ (p.7). These stem from unhappy and often abusive upbringings 
where basic needs, such as those for secure attachments to others and the freedom 
to express emotions, are unmet. 
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Young proposed that there are ‘different aspects of self’, or modes, that interact to 
form the inner world of borderline clients. At their core is the abandoned and abused 
child, helpless and frightened and desperately seeking care. The angry and 
impulsive child rages against their cruel treatment and unmet needs and is punished 
by the punitive parent. This is an identification with, and internalization of, 
invalidating and rejecting caregivers, who affirms the child’s ‘badness’. In order to 
survive, the detached protector keeps clients safe by emotionally shutting down, 
avoiding intolerable feelings of distress or connection with others. In therapy the 
underdeveloped healthy adult mode is promoted, who nurtures and protects the 
vulnerable child, limits the angry child and fights the punitive parent.  
Work initially focuses on developing an affirming, corrective relationship between 
therapist and client. In this period another aim is to enhance clients’ emotional 
regulation, exploring the feelings that trigger episodes of self-destructive behaviour 
and developing self-care plans. In the second phase of therapy schema modes are 
named and then changed using various techniques. Dialogue work (conversations 
between different aspects of the personality using empty chairs or visualisation) for 
example, is employed to encourage the detached protector to step aside and allow 
the abused child to make contact with the therapist, and also to fight the punitive 
parent, expunging their voice. Using imagery the punishing parent can also be 
challenged through revisiting memories as an adult who can protect the vulnerable 
child. The therapist further helps clients to explore ways the angry child can have 
their pain heard without hurting themselves or others. Eventually clients prepare to 
use all they have learned and achieved through sessions to enhance their 
interpersonal relationships and sense of identity outside.  
To date only one study has empirically investigated a possible mechanism of 
change in SFT. Spinhoven, Giesen-Bloo, van Dyck, Koolman and Arntz (2007) 
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looked at whether improvement in the therapeutic relationship over the first year of 
therapy was related to later clinical improvement in SFT (n = 33) and TFP (n = 21), 
defined as reduced scores on the Borderline Personality Disorder Severity Index 
(BPDSI-IV; Arntz et al., 2003). Therapeutic alliance was measured at three months, 
fifteen months and thirty-three months using the patient and therapist forms of the 
Working Alliance Inventory (WAI-P and WAI-T respectively, Horvath & Greenberg, 
1989) and therapists’ responses to the Difficult Doctor Patient Relationship 
Questionnaire-Ten Item Version (DDPRQ-10; Hahn, Thompson, Budner, Stern & 
Wills, 1994). Cross-lagged correlations revealed that early to mid treatment changes 
in WAI-P showed a significant relationship with mid to late treatment BPDSI scores. 
This outcome measure shared no significant association with early to mid treatment 
change in alliance as rated by therapists (WAI-T and DDPRQ) though, suggesting 
that the client’s experience of the therapeutic relationship may mediate change. The 
authors further found evidence that in the first three months of treatment therapist 
ratings of the quality of the therapeutic alliance predicted premature termination of 
work in TFP, and after three months both patient and therapist ratings were 
associated with time to dropout for both therapies. Comparing SFT and TFP the 
study revealed that both therapists and clients rate the therapeutic alliance more 
favourably in SFT (even when controlling for therapeutic change) and also that while 
clients receiving both interventions reported improvements in their relationship over 
time, therapists delivering TFP showed increasing frustration while this decreased in 
SFT. Despite this, clinical improvement was not significantly associated with 
treatment condition. 
As with most studies reviewed here, the correlational design does not enable a 
conclusion to be made regarding the direction of causality, but it tentatively suggests 
that the therapeutic alliance might act as one mediator in both SFT and TFP 
outcomes, reinforcing the feelings of participants in Cunningham et al. (2004) and 
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Perseius et al.’s (2003) studies. As the authors highlighted, this is not to say that 
other factors, both common and unique to different approaches, do not contribute to 
change in BPD. It is also important to be aware of the debates presented above 
regarding the status of therapeutic alliance as a mediator of change.  
Transference-focused psychotherapy 
Object relations dyads are internalized representations of relationships comprised of 
a representation of the self and the other, connected by affect (Levy, Clarkin et al., 
2006). Internal worlds are populated by many of these representations, some 
positive, some negative, and it is the integration of all of these that allows us to view 
people, ourselves and our experiences as a coherent whole. Kernberg (1984) 
suggested that this integration can be prevented however by intense negative affect. 
This can result from constitution, experiences or a combination of both. In a state of 
distress it is proposed that positive representations are split off from negative 
representations to protect them from being overwhelmed and destroyed. This total 
splitting of the world, relationships and the self into all good or all bad leads to an 
incoherent and fragmented experience of reality, characteristic of BPD. The 
resulting affective instability further prevents the integration of these disparate 
representations.  
This understanding of the cause and maintenance of BPD led to the development of 
TFP which aims to help clients to integrate split-off representations, increasing their 
sense of coherence and reducing their use of primitive defenses, such as splitting 
and denial.  Levy, Meehan et al. (2006) explained that as clients achieve more 
coherent representations of themselves and others they become more able to reflect 
on mental states, or to mentalize. This is defined as ‘the process by which an 
individual implicitly and explicitly interprets the actions of himself and others as 
meaningful on the basis of…desires, needs, feelings, beliefs, and reasons’ 
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(Bateman & Fonagy, 2004, p.21). The capacity to mentalize within the context of an 
attachment relationship has been operationalized as reflective function (RF; Fonagy 
et al., 1995). As this increases so does the capacity to develop secure attachments, 
enabling individuals to use others as a secure base from which they can explore 
their internal and external world, and also as a safe haven in times of distress (Levy, 
Meehan et al., 2006). This, in turn, is theorised to lead to the ultimate goals of TFP, 
enabling clients to enjoy greater intimacy in relationships and enhancing affect 
regulation, behavioural control and the ability to pursue aspirations (Clarkin, Levy, 
Lenzenweger, & Kernberg, 2004).   
The treatment is highly structured and begins with the collaborative development of 
a contract setting out rules for therapy that address potential threats to treatment 
and to the client and defining roles, boundaries and emergency procedures. Once 
this is agreed therapy focuses on exploring the client’s internal world through 
transference, the redirection of feelings for one object, often from childhood, onto 
another, in this case the therapist. Using what is experienced in the here and now, 
the client and therapist seek to understand and eventually question the split-off 
internal representations which are played out in their relationship through 
clarification, confrontation and interpretation. 
In line with this theory, Levy, Meehan et al. (2006) predicted that RF and attachment 
security would be enhanced through TFP and hypothesized that these might act as 
mechanisms of change. Ninety participants with BPD were randomised into three 
conditions: TFP (n=31), DBT (n=29) and supportive psychotherapy (SPT, n = 30). 
Participants completed the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI: George, Kaplan, & 
Main, 1996), which was scored for RF, at assessment and after 12 months of 
therapy. Across this time both RF and attachment coherence (the capacity to relate 
attachment experiences, both positive and negative, in a coherent way) were found 
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to increase as a function of treatment with TFP. Participants also showed significant 
changes in attachment pattern, with an increased percentage being classified as 
securely attached after a year of therapy. When looking at treatment groups 
however this change was only significant for those clients who had received TFP. 
The authors hypothesized that these changes promote improved functioning by 
acting as ‘buffers against internal and external stressors’ (p.1037), making clients 
less likely to create stressful situations and more able to cope with natural stressors. 
The greatest limitation in this study is that BPD symptoms are not measured 
throughout therapy. Without this information a statistical association between the 
proposed mechanisms of change and treatment outcomes cannot be demonstrated 
and it therefore cannot be concluded that improvements in RF or attachment are 
related to therapeutic change in clients. There is also no attempt to investigate their 
hypotheses explaining how these potential mechanisms come about or how they act 
to improve functioning. These are important areas for further study. 
Diamond, Stovall-McClough, Clarkin and Levy (2003) also investigated the role of 
attachment and RF in therapeutic change. Using case studies and measures of 
attachment they investigated how attachment state of mind and RF in both clients 
and their therapists influence therapeutic process and outcome. Ten clients with 
BPD participated in the study, completing the AAI after four months and again after 
a year receiving therapy. Both therapist and client were also assessed using the 
Patient-Therapist Adult Attachment Interview (PT-AAI; Diamond et al., 1999) after 
one year of treatment. Diamond et al. found that over the year most clients showed 
improved RF, behaviour, symptomatology and attachment status, however they did 
not comment on how this was measured or the association between change in RF 
and these outcomes. 
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In the majority of cases therapists scored more highly in RF than their clients, 
forming more rich and integrated understandings of both their own and their clients’ 
mental states. Diamond et al. (2003) highlighted that this difference was particularly 
noticeable in a participant demonstrating one of the smallest changes in attachment. 
From this observation it was suggested that in order for clients to build new 
understandings of themselves and others their RF level should not differ too much 
from that of their therapist. A case report within the paper however, following a client 
who showed no improvement in RF, implied conversely that change was hindered 
by the therapist having the same RF rating, directly mirroring their experience and 
perhaps not offering a different enough perspective to be containing. The authors 
therefore concluded that to optimise outcomes client and therapist RF levels should 
be ‘complementary’. They suggested that therapists can successfully scaffold the 
development of this capacity by working in what Vygotsky (1978) termed the zone of 
proximal development (between what the client can achieve alone and what they 
can do with support).   
These conclusions are made however from the results of a small sample size. 
Further, crucially, Diamond et al. (2003) did not statistically demonstrate an 
association between RF and treatment outcomes, essential in concluding mediation. 
Together these studies do suggest however that TFP enhances RF and attachment 
patterns. Further research should look to determine whether these improvements 
are associated with reduced symptomatology. 
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Discussion 
Despite increasing evidence for the effectiveness of various therapies in treating 
BPD, little is known about what explains these positive outcomes. This review 
evaluated the evidence for various processes theoretically supposed to effect 
therapeutic change, exploring which are promising candidates as mediators of this 
process. The results largely echo the conclusions of the Cochrane review of 
psychological therapies for people with BPD: ‘the studies are too few and small to 
inspire full confidence in their results… [and their] findings require replication in 
larger ‘real-world’ studies’ (Binks et al. 2009, p.2).   
While researchers have investigated various plausible mechanisms of change, using 
different methodologies, samples have often been small and unrepresentative. 
Across the papers reviewed, an overwhelming proportion of participants were 
female. While the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE; 2009) 
reported that more women present to services than men they also noted that in the 
community its prevalence is roughly equal between genders (Singleton, Bumpstead, 
O’Brien, Lee, & Meltzer, 2003), suggesting that the samples used in these studies 
do not accurately reflect the BPD population.  
Methodological issues have also limited the conclusions that can be drawn from 
these studies. Referring back to Kazdin’s (2007) criteria for demonstrating 
mediation, studies must first find a statistical association between the intervention 
and the potential mechanism of change, and between this mechanism and 
treatment outcome. Kazdin (2007) referred to this as the ‘initial requirement… if 
these three variables are not related, the case for the operation of a mediator is 
greatly weakened, if not eliminated’ (p. 5). Several studies reviewed failed to look for 
this relationship or to report it. Another of Kazdin’s (2007) criteria, the establishment 
of the temporal relationship between mediators and outcomes, he described as ‘the 
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Achilles’ heel of treatment studies’ (p.5). In line with this view, none of the studies 
reviewed ascertained this timeline, making it impossible to know which changes in 
therapy occurred first.  
Despite these limitations however, these studies have begun to reveal associations 
which may prove important in the mediation of clinical outcomes in BPD treatment. 
The largest body of research regarding change mechanisms investigates the 
mediators of DBT. The studies reviewed here suggest that positive outcomes could 
stem from the use of the skills taught as part of this therapy, which showed 
correlations with decreases in borderline features, suicide attempts and depression 
and increased anger control. Emotional regulation skills in particular were 
experienced as helpful in Cunningham et al.’s (2004) qualitative study and this was 
reinforced by findings that increased emotional regulation was significantly 
associated with decreased substance use that could not be explained by 
improvements in mood. The top rated skill in Dewe et al.’s (2007) survey was also 
from this module, and Davenport et al.’s (2010) exploration of self-control, of which 
emotional control is a part, found that post-treatment participants scored no 
differently to norms in this feature.  
While participants in Cunningham et al.’s (2004) paper discussed the positive impact 
of enhanced emotional control, both in this study and that by Perseius et al. (2003) 
clients valued the therapeutic relationship as one of the most effective aspects of 
their treatment. In quantitative studies too this non-specific factor was found to 
influence therapeutic change. The developing therapeutic alliance was found to be 
predictive of outcome in Spinhoven et al.’s (2007) investigation into SFT and TFP for 
example. Attitudes towards treatment and the fit between therapist and client in 
cognitive abilities such as IC and RF, which might influence this alliance, have also 
been found to affect therapeutic gain in CBT (Davidson et al., 2007) and TFP 
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(Diamond et al., 2003) respectively. Although it has not been tested, theoretically the 
growing therapeutic relationship could also facilitate change in MBT, symptom 
reduction being understood to result from clients developing a secure attachment 
with the therapist within which they are safe to explore the mental states of 
themselves and others (Bateman, & Fonagy, 2004).   
Although the therapeutic relationship is a factor linked to successful outcomes 
across therapies and diagnoses (Weinberger, 1995), Frieswyk et al. (1986) 
suggested that this component may be especially relevant in the treatment of BPD,  
given clients’ difficulties in developing and maintaining relationships. They proposed 
that the ‘success or failure [of the alliance] and its vicissitudes spell the outcome of 
the process’ (p.37). NICE (2009) recognised this, presenting principles to promote a 
positive therapeutic relationship in treating clients with a diagnosis of BPD, 
describing how this ‘is at times as important as the specific treatments offered’ 
(p.11). As Weinberger’s (1995) review stated however, while both quantitative data 
and client reports attribute therapeutic outcome to the therapeutic relationship, it is 
still important to explore its operation.  
There are many potential pathways to understanding this in the context of BPD. 
Bateman and Fonagy (2004) for example posit that the development of this 
relationship enhances mentalization, or RF (found to increase in both TFP studies), 
which in turn facilitates the regulation of emotions (emotional control, associated 
with clinical outcomes in DBT studies) and attention. It is also possible that the 
experience of being in a relationship which is validating and non-threatening may in 
itself challenge the dysfunctional beliefs that characterise BPD and have been 
revealed to reduce over the course of CBT. Discovering whether these or other 
potential mediators are developed or facilitated through a strengthening therapeutic 
alliance would contribute towards enhancing this understanding and investigating 
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whether, as Livesley’s (2005) integrative model suggests, a collaborative 
relationship is key for therapeutic change.  
In order to strengthen this theory of an underlying common change mechanism, 
research should also continue to investigate the association between mediators, 
such as mentalization and emotional regulation, and clinical outcomes across 
different therapeutic modalities, as some studies here did. Discovering universal 
mechanisms of change could allow us to focus interventions on enhancing these 
processes and therefore improve outcomes for clients with this diagnosis. 
In conclusion, this review of mechanisms of change in effective treatment for BPD 
has revealed that future research is required to learn how these interventions work. 
Studies to date have highlighted the difficulty in demonstrating the causality of 
potential mediators, but have also begun to reveal associations between different 
aspects of therapy and clinical outcome. Most consistently the developing 
therapeutic relationship, and factors that could relate to this, have been found 
important in predicting the effectiveness of treatments, both through qualitative and 
quantitative studies. Further research is now needed to explore how this relationship 
helps to foster change, testing hypotheses as to why this bond is so important in 
rebuilding the lives of those diagnosed with BPD.  
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Do difficulties in mentalizing correlate with severity of  
borderline personality disorder? 
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Abstract 
Aims: This study aimed to explore the relationship between impairments in 
mentalizing and symptom severity in individuals diagnosed with borderline 
personality disorder (BPD). It was hypothesised that the two would be correlated, 
given the theory that deficits in mentalization underlie the symptoms that 
characterise the disorder. The study also compared mentalizing capacity in the 
current sample to that of a group with a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder 
(ASPD). The theory that the disorders share the same psychopathology led to the 
prediction that there would be similarities in their performance.  
Method: 25 people with a diagnosis of BPD completed a questionnaire measuring 
the severity of their symptoms. In order to activate the attachment system, 
participants were then asked to reflect on difficult experiences in early attachment 
relationships, before completing a battery of three tasks measuring different aspects 
of mentalization.   
Results: Correlational analyses found that, contrary to prediction, there was no 
evidence to support a relationship between mentalizing impairments and the 
severity of BPD symptoms. Significant differences in performance across the BPD 
and ASPD groups were revealed, with the BPD sample demonstrating greater 
accuracy in two of the three tasks.  
Conclusions: The study was underpowered due to difficulties in recruitment and 
this could account for its unexpected findings. Further research is recommended to 
investigate the relationship between mentalization ability and severity of BPD. 
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Introduction 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a severe and complex disorder, 
characterised by a pervasive pattern of emotional lability, poor impulse control, 
unstable and intense relationships with others  and an unstable sense of identity 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  It is associated with difficulties in social, 
psychological and occupational functioning and a suicide mortality rate 50 times that 
of the general population (Skodol et al., 2002).  
Bateman and Fonagy contended that underlying these symptoms are deficits in the 
capacity to mentalize, ‘the process by which we make sense of each other and 
ourselves, implicitly and explicitly, in terms of subjective states and mental 
processes’ (Bateman, & Fonagy, 2010, p.11). Mentalizing is a multifaceted concept, 
organized along four dimensions: self/other focused, controlled/automatic, 
external/internal-based and cognitive/affective (Fonagy, & Luyten, 2009). It involves 
reflecting on the minds of ourselves and of others, both of which, Allen (2006) 
highlighted, can be equally elusive, and sometimes frightening to comprehend. 
Mentalizing is achieved both explicitly, through controlled, conscious reflection, and 
implicitly, through automatic and intuitive processes. In conversation for example, 
we will generally mentalize implicitly, reflexively understanding when it is our turn to 
talk and adjusting our tone and body language according to what our partner is 
communicating. This is quite different to the process of actively reflecting on and 
assessing our own and others’ internal experiences. Our understanding of others 
can be gained using both external features, such as a person’s facial expression or 
their gestures, and also by focussing on internal experiences, considering what 
others may be feeling, thinking or intending.  Genuine understanding of others 
requires us to develop not only representations of what others believe but to 
recognise and identify with their feelings, or to empathise. 
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Fonagy and Luyten (2009) suggested that individuals with a diagnosis of BPD are 
impaired in the domains of explicit, internal and cognitive mentalizing. That is, they 
find it difficult to reflect consciously on the internal experiences of themselves and 
others, they are more successful in inferring states of mind from physical cues than 
by focusing on ‘mental interiors’, and they can powerfully experience the emotional 
states of others without being able to fully comprehend their perspective. Fonagy 
and Luyten (2009) further contended that these difficulties affect their capacity to 
differentiate between themselves and others, increasing their vulnerability to 
becoming overwhelmed by others’ emotions.   
It is understood that we learn to mentalize through being mentalized (Allen, & 
Bleiberg, & Haslam-Hopwood, 2003). This occurs within the context of a secure 
attachment, which Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist and Target (2002) argued creates a safe 
base for exploring not just the outside world, but the inner worlds of ourselves and 
others.  Within this context infants can begin to learn about their own emotions, 
using the responses of caregivers to convert their unlabelled and confusing internal 
states into contained experiences that they can recognise and understand. This is 
achieved through mirroring, caregivers providing accurate but altered 
representations of infants’ affective states. A caregiver might respond to their child’s 
distress with an exaggerated frown for example, expressing not only an 
understanding of their emotions but also care (Choi-Kain, & Gunderson, 2008). This 
can then be internalized by the infant, containing their intolerable feelings. Mirroring 
therefore not only helps children to label their emotions but teaches them that they 
can be modulated. Recognising mirrored emotions as belonging to the caregiver 
rather than being an expression of their own internal state further creates a sense of 
agency in the infant, who has initiated this response in their caregiver, and also a 
developing sense of self as being distinct from others (Fonagy & Bateman, 2007).    
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Not all children experience the secure attachment conducive to developing this 
understanding however, nor find themselves accurately represented in the mind of 
another. This could result from the child’s genetic temperament, their environment, 
or the interaction between the two (Fonagy, & Bateman, 2007). A bad fit between 
child and caregiver for example could hinder the development of a secure 
attachment relationship between them, a child could grow up in an environment 
where emotional states are not discussed, or in more severe cases children can 
suffer abuse at the hands of their caregivers. Fonagy and Bateman (2006) proposed 
that the resulting deficit in mentalization is likely to be secondary to hyperactivity of 
the attachment system. Individuals with diagnoses of BPD appear to respond with 
greater arousal to interpersonal situations which trigger the attachment system. 
Further, their history of trauma within attachment relationships is understood to 
reduce the threshold at which conscious, reflective, explicit mentalizing is lost to 
automatic, intuitive, implicit mentalizing and consequently to non-mentalizing 
(Fonagy, & Luyten, 2009). When this happens experiences are understood through 
modes that predate mentalizing, such as psychic equivalence, where thoughts are 
experienced as reality, or teleological mode, where the feelings of others are only 
understood as real if they are physically expressed. Combined with overwhelming 
arousal this results in the symptoms associated with BPD.   
Mentalization based treatment (MBT; Bateman, & Fonagy, 2006) aims to stabilise 
clients’ sense of self, through fostering mentalization about the self, others and 
relationships. MBT appreciates that it is within a secure relationship, such as that 
between client and therapist, these skills can grow, but that it is also intimacy that 
causes the lapses in mentalization that characterise BPD. Much of the work within 
sessions therefore focuses on holding onto mentalizing during states of arousal or 
reinstating this where it has been lost. This is facilitated through various techniques 
such as ‘stop, rewind, explore’, where the individual or group retrace the events and 
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emotions that led to a disruption of mentalizing, or simply ‘stop and stand’, where 
the therapist interrupts the session to ask the client to reflect on an aspect of the 
conversation that suggested a lack of mentalization. The recovery of this capacity is 
also encouraged by the ‘inquisitively curious, not-knowing attitude – which requires 
tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty’ (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008, p.182) 
therapists take in MBT. 
MBT (Bateman & Fonagy, 2008) is just one of many interventions that have 
demonstrable effectiveness in treating individuals diagnosed with BPD (de Groot, 
Verheul, & Trijsburg, 2008; National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence, 
2009). These include transference-focused psychotherapy (TFP; Giesen-Bloo et al., 
2006) and also cognitive therapies such as cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT; 
Davidson et al., 2006), dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT; Linehan et al., 2006) and 
schema focused therapy (SFT; Giesen-Bloo et al., 2006). It is not yet known which 
aspects of these interventions are responsible for their outcomes, but this 
knowledge would be invaluable in enabling us to optimise treatment effectiveness 
for individuals with a diagnosis of BPD. Kazdin (2007) contended that it is likely that 
common change mechanisms underlie treatments of different modalities and 
Livesley’s (2005) framework similarly posited that it may be of more value in BPD 
treatment to focus on nonspecific factors such as the development and maintenance 
of a therapeutic relationship. Bateman and Fonagy (2004) recognised that most 
approaches consider the therapeutic alliance an important aspect of treatment. The 
strength of this relationship is also known to contribute to the success of all forms of 
psychological interventions. Kazdin (2007) however argued that ‘next-step’ research 
is needed to explain how this supportive relationship causes symptom change. 
Bateman and Fonagy (2004) suggested that the experience of security within an 
attachment relationship enables individuals to feel safe to explore the mental states 
of themselves and others and therefore enhances mentalization.  Regardless of 
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orientation, therapists facilitate this exploration, labelling and mirroring feelings they 
don’t understand and providing an experience of seeing things from different 
perspectives. Given this argument, they contended that any ‘successful treatment 
must have mentalization as its focus or at least stimulate development of 
mentalizing as an epiphenomenon’ (Fonagy, & Bateman, 2007, p.84).  
Despite the clinical implications of mentalizing impairments in BPD, this relationship 
is poorly understood empirically. Studies exploring this association have yielded 
inconsistent results (Domes, Schulze, & Herpetz, 2009; Franzen et al., 2011; 
Preißler, Dziobek, Ritter, Heekeren, & Roepke, 2010). Some have revealed impaired 
performance in mentalizing. Levine, Marziali, & Hood (1997) for example, found that 
participants meeting BPD criteria scored significantly below healthy controls in 
several tests of emotional processing. These included tasks that required 
participants to identify emotions from facial expressions presented in photographs 
(this finding was replicated by Bland, Williams, Scharer, & Manning, 2004), and 
measures that analysed their emotional responses to vignettes. These explored 
participants’ capacity for recognizing mixed emotions and their ability to differentiate 
their own feelings from those of others.  
In contrast, recent studies have revealed that BPD groups outperform healthy 
controls in tests of mentalizing. Fertuck et al. (2009) found enhanced sensitivity in 
individuals diagnosed with BPD in inferring the internal states of others from 
photographs of their eyes, using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET; 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001. Please see Methods section 
for details). Arntz, Bernstein, Oorschot and Schobre (2009) also revealed a 
tendency for those with a diagnosis of BPD to demonstrate more accuracy than 
healthy controls on an advanced theory of mind test. This required participants to 
make attributions about characters’ thoughts, feelings and intentions in stories 
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containing persuasion, white lies and double bluffs. Similarly, Franzen et al. (2011) 
found that participants with a diagnosis of BPD showed superiority in inferring the 
intentions of others in a virtual game that required participants to make decisions 
based upon their partner’s emotional facial cues and previous behaviours. 
Reflecting this inconsistency, Harari, Shamay-Tsoory, Ravid and Lekovitz (2010) 
found a double dissociation in their study. Participants diagnosed with BPD showed 
enhanced affective empathy (the capacity to share the emotional experience of 
another) compared to controls, but impaired cognitive empathy (the ability to 
understand others’ perspectives). Preißler et al. (2010) too found conflicting results, 
comparing social cognitive abilities in women with a diagnosis of BPD and healthy 
controls. They used two tests of mentalization, the RMET and the Movie for the 
Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006).  The MASC requires 
participants to attribute intentions, emotions and thoughts to characters in a film 
(please see Methods section for details). Their results revealed weaker performance 
on the MASC in those diagnosed with BPD compared to controls, but no difference 
in scores on the RMET. The authors suggested that this outcome reflected the 
superior sensitivity and ecological validity of the MASC and concluded therefore that 
those with a BPD diagnosis have a significant impairment in their capacity to 
mentalize. It is possible however that deficits were not revealed in the RMET 
because this task, unlike the MASC, requires participants to make inferences based 
purely on visible features, an ability that research suggests is unimpaired or even 
enhanced in those diagnosed with BPD. Understood in this way, these results 
reinforce Fonagy and Luyten’s (2009) proposal that mentalizing impairments are not 
global but are found in specific domains, in this case internal mentalizing rather than 
external. Harari et al’s (2010) study similarly strengthens the hypothesis that 
underlying BPD symptoms is a deficit in cognitive but not affective mentalizing.  
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To improve research into mentalizing, Choi-Kain and Gunderson (2008) promoted 
the use of tasks that reflect the various dimensions encapsulated by this ability. Both 
research and theory converge to suggest that impairments in mentalizing in BPD are 
not global but confined to specific domains. These may even be overcompensated 
by superior abilities in other dimensions (Fonagy, & Luyen, 2009). Single measures 
therefore cannot reflect the complexity and multidimensionality of this construct. This 
study employed several measures of mentalization, with the aim of investigating 
abilities across its different domains. It explored performance in both the RMET and 
the MASC, replicating Preißler et al.’s (2010) study, and also a recently developed 
Computerised Perspective Taking Task (CPTT; Dumontheil, Apperly & Blakemore, 
2010) which assesses internal and cognitive aspects of mentalizing, requiring 
participants to use another’s perceptual perspective to complete a task. 
Newbury-Helps (2011) recently used this battery of tasks to investigate 
mentalization in individuals with a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder 
(ASPD), given Bateman and Fonagy’s (2008) hypothesis that violent and controlling 
acts result from sudden losses of mentalizing in response to challenges to integrity. 
He found subtle deficits in performance on all three measures.  
Paris (1997) highlighted that there are in fact many similarities between BPD and 
ASPD, particularly their underlying impulsive personality traits. He suggested that 
both disorders may be different manifestations of the same psychopathology 
according to gender. He explained that females might learn to express their 
impulsivity internally through the self-destructive behaviours characteristic of BPD, 
while males externalise, hurting others, as seen in ASPD.  
Evidence for mentalizing impairments in ASPD, as in BPD, has been inconsistent. 
Dolan and Fullam (2004) used several theory of mind tasks, measuring different 
dimensions of mentalizing ability, to compare this in participants with a diagnosis of 
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ASPD and healthy controls. They found that while the clinical group demonstrated 
impairment on certain aspects of the tasks they outperformed the control group on 
others.  Taken together, their results suggested that those with an ASPD diagnosis 
could take the perspective of another but lacked concern about others’ emotional 
experiences. Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Aharon-Peretz and Levkovitz (2010) similarly 
found that mentalizing deficits in participants diagnosed with ASPD were only 
evident in measures of affective, and not cognitive, theory of mind. These results 
suggest a different profile to that demonstrated in individuals with BPD who 
conversely show impairments in the cognitive but not affective domain of 
mentalizing. This contradicts Paris’s (1997) proposal of a shared underlying 
psychopathology. In order to explore this idea further, this study compared the 
performance of individuals with a diagnosis of BPD to that of Newbury-Helps’ (2011) 
sample, diagnosed with ASPD. 
In sum, this study aimed (1) to investigate correlations between different measures 
of mentalization and severity of BPD and (2) to compare performance in these tasks 
between this sample and one recruited from an ASPD population. In line with 
Fonagy and Luyten’s (2009) proposal that deficits in BPD are specifically in the 
domains of cognitive and internal mentalization, it is predicted that BPD severity is 
likely to correlate negatively with scores on tasks measuring these abilities (the 
MASC and CPTT). Paris’s (1997) argument for a shared psychopathology 
underlying BPD and ASPD suggests that similarities can be hypothesised in the 
mentalizing profile of the two samples, however previous research into mentalization 
across the cognitive/affective domain has begun to contradict this claim. 
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Method 
Design 
This was a correlational study using a cross-sectional design. 
Participants 
Twenty-five participants with a primary diagnosis of BPD were recruited from a 
specialist personality disorder service. All had recently been assessed within the 
service.  
Individuals with a diagnosis of a learning disability or head injury were excluded from 
this study since it is hard to distinguish whether behavioural and emotional 
difficulties in these populations are attributable to these diagnoses or to personality 
disorder (Alexander, & Cooray, 2003; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
Individuals younger than 18, or currently experiencing a psychotic disorder were 
also excluded from participating as they did not meet the referral criteria within the 
service.  
Measures 
Borderline Evaluation of Severity Over Time: BEST (Pfohl, Blum, & Zimmerman, 
1997) 
Although participants all had a diagnosis of BPD, this study investigated the 
relationship between the severity of BPD symptoms and performance in tasks of 
mentalizing. This was measured using the BEST (see Appendix A). This is a self-
report measure which requires participants to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale how 
much 12 different thoughts, feelings and negative behaviours have caused distress 
or difficulties over the past seven days (none to extreme). It also asks how often 
they have been able to use three positive behaviours (almost always to almost 
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never). The internal consistency coefficient for individuals with BPD has been found 
high at 0.86, and test-retest reliability moderate at 0.62 (Pfohl, Blum, St. John, 
McCormick, Allen, & Black, 2009). The BEST has been used previously in research 
exploring the efficacy of BPD treatments (eg. Black, Blum, Eichinger, McCormick, 
Allen, & Sieleni, 2008; Harvey, Black, & Blum, 2010).  
Computerised Perspective Taking Task: CPTT (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 
2010) 
This was a computerized task, presented on a laptop. It was written in E-Prime 2.0 
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). Participants were read the instructions provided 
(Appendix B) then shown a 4x4 set of shelves containing eight objects. Auditory 
instructions were given to participants to move different objects up, down, left or 
right, using the touchpad.  
In the director condition participants were told that the director, who stood behind 
the shelves, would give their instructions. Five compartments of each set of shelves 
had grey backgrounds representing screens that blocked the director from viewing 
their contents. This had to be remembered when he gave instructions to move 
objects, and participants were instructed to take his point of view into account when 
responding to these. Sixteen different shelf-object configurations were then 
presented, each with three instructions. Eight of the forty-eight instructions were 
experimental trials, where participants were required to take the perspective of the 
director and ignore a distractor object in the grey slot, invisible to the director; eight 
were control trials, where the shelf arrangement was identical except for the 
distractor item which was replaced by an irrelevant object (see Figure 1); thirty-two 
were fillers, referring to items in slots that could be seen by both participant and 
director. In the no-director condition participants were told that the director was not 
there anymore. It was explained that the further instructions they would receive only 
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referred to the objects in the clear slots, and that those with the grey screens were 
to be ignored. All other aspects of the task (number and type of trials) remained 
identical.  
Participants’ accuracy and speed were recorded in this task, producing scores in 
director condition experimental errors, director condition control errors, no-director 
condition experimental errors, no-director condition control errors, and response 
times for correct responses in each condition.  
Figure 1. An example of an experimental (left) and control (right) trial in the director 
condition of the CPTT. The director has just instructed the participant to ‘Move the 
large cup up.’ In the experimental trial (left) the participant is required to take the 
perspective of the director and move the target cup that is visible to both of them. If 
they fail to do this they would move the distractor cup which is the largest cup on the 
shelves but is invisible to the director. In the control trial (right) the distractor item is 
replaced by an irrelevant object so participants can correctly respond to the 
director’s instruction without taking his perspective.  
 
                         
 
Both conditions are matched in their executive demands, requiring participants to 
inhibit their automatic reaction to move the object that fits the instruction from their 
perspective. The director condition however requires that participants take into 
account not simply the colour of the slot, but what is visible to the director.   
Perspective taking is an important aspect of internal and cognitive mentalizing. Our 
ability to imagine the visual experience of another allows us to infer their beliefs and 
Move the 
large cup up. 
 
Move the 
large cup up. 
 
Distractor 
Target 
Irrelevant object 
Target 
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understanding of situations in order to explain and predict their behaviour. The 
CPTT was therefore used in this study to measure internal and cognitive aspects of 
mentalization.  
The task has demonstrated main effects of condition (director/no-director) (p < 
0.001), trial type (control/experimental) (p < 0.001) and also age groups (young 
children/older children/young adolescents/older adolescents/adults) (p < 0.001). 
Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition – Multiple Choice version: MASC-MC 
(Dziobek et al., 2006; Fleck et al., 2006) 
Participants viewed a 15 minute film in which four characters spend an evening 
together at a dinner party. This was presented on a Microsoft PowerPoint slideshow 
controlled by the researcher, with the instructions that participants should watch very 
carefully and try to understand what each character is feeling or thinking. Before the 
film began participants were shown photographs to introduce them to each 
character they would be meeting. They were informed that the film would be paused 
at various points and that questions would be asked. In answering these, 
participants were instructed to try to imagine what the characters were feeling or 
thinking at the very moment the film was stopped. They were also informed that the 
film was dubbed. 
Forty-three video clips were then shown, each followed by one or more questions 
with four possible answers (see Figure 2). Of these questions, 45 regarded the 
characters’ intentions (19), feelings (18) and thoughts (8) and 6 required no 
mentalizing and controlled for memory and general comprehension effects and the 
making of non-social inferences. Each set of possible answers included an accurate 
mentalizing response and three incorrect answers based on the responses given by 
participants in the original version of the task where no multiple choice answers 
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were presented (Dziobek et al., 2006). The incorrect responses reflected three 
different types of mistakes: (1) ‘undermentalizing’, demonstrating insufficient 
mentalizing in attributing characters’ mental states , (2) ‘hypermentalizing’, resulting 
in attributions that are ‘too excessive’, and (3) non-mentalizing, showing a complete 
lack of mentalization. Examples of these can be seen in Figure 2. Participants were 
asked to tell the researcher which they thought was the most accurate response 
from the four different answers and this was recorded on a multiple choice answer 
sheet. Participants therefore gained a correct mentalization score, with subscores 
for correctly attributing intentions, feelings and thoughts, a correct control score, and 
also scores for mistakes that show ‘hypermentalizing’, ‘undermentalizing’ and a lack 
of mentalizing.   
Figure 2. An example of a question from the MASC. Sandra has just been into the 
kitchen to get Cliff some cola and has checked on the cake to find that it is ‘ruined – 
totally burnt!’ The four answers represent (a) insufficient mentalizing, (b) accurate 
mentalizing, (c) excessive mentalizing, and (d) no mentalizing.  
 
Correct answers in this task required accurate recognition of physical and verbal 
indicators of mental states as well as an ability to consider the feelings, thoughts 
and beliefs of the characters. The film was designed to approximate everyday social 
interactions, requiring participants to use facial cues, body language, gestures, and 
literal and figurative expressions to attribute positive, negative and neutral emotions 
and intentions to others. The MASC was therefore used in this study as a measure 
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of both internal and external mentalizing, and also mentalizing in cognitive and 
affective domains.  
The measure has demonstrated highly satisfactory internal consistency 
(Chronbach’s alpha = 0.84), and good test-retest reliability (intraclass correlation 
coefficient = 0.97). It has previously been used to demonstrate specific social 
impairments in populations with diagnoses of Asperger’s syndrome (Dziobek et al., 
2006), euthymic bipolar disorder (Montag et al., 2010), paranoid schizophrenia 
(Montag et al., 2011) and BPD (Preißler et al.,2010). 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes, Revised Version: RMET (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001) 
Using a Microsoft PowerPoint slideshow on a laptop, 36 of photographs actor’s eyes 
(18 female, 18 male) were shown to participants. These were presented with four 
words, one a correct description of the person’s mental state, the others foils with 
the same emotional valence (see Figure 3). Participants were asked to tell the 
researcher which word best described what the person in the picture was thinking or 
feeling. The word they selected was circled on a multiple choice answer sheet. 
Participants were provided with word definitions to use if they did not understand 
any of the descriptors used in the task. A score was obtained for each participant by 
adding together the answers they got correct.  
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Figure 3. Two of the questions presented in the RMET. In these examples the 
correct answers are (3) desire, and (4) insisting. 
 
The RMET was used in this study as a measure of external mentalizing, requiring 
participants to infer the mental state of another based on their visible features. It 
also assesses cognitive and affective mentalization, correct answers requiring that 
participants use these cues to take the perspective of the people in the photographs, 
understanding their beliefs and intentions, and also to identify their emotional states.  
In the original study developing this measure, Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) found a 
significant main effect of group in a one-way ANOVA, comparing adults with 
Asperger’s syndrome or high functioning autism, to three control groups, F(3, 250) =  
17.87, p = 0.0001. Since its development the task has also successfully 
differentiated healthy control groups from populations with various diagnoses 
including schizophrenia (Schimansky, David, Rössler, & Haker, 2010), depression 
(Lee, Harkness, Sabbagh, & Jacobson, 2005) and anorexia nervosa (Harrison, 
Sullivan, Tchanturia, & Treasure, 2009). In BPD samples the RMET has yielded 
inconsistent results, Fertuck et al. (2009) revealing enhanced sensitivity in this task 
compared to controls, while Preißler et al. (2010) found no significant differences in 
performance. 
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Other sources of data 
As well as the measures completed for this study, participants had completed the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders (SCID-II: First, 
Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams, & Benjamin, 1997) and Treatment History Inventory (THI: 
Linehan, 1987) as part of their assessment process. These outcomes and 
demographic data (date of birth and ethnicity) were provided by their therapists.  
Procedure 
The National Research Ethics Service Committee London - East approved the study 
(Appendix C). Participants were recruited through their therapists. They were asked 
to refer all clients they had met for assessment and any within their first four weeks 
of receiving therapy at the service. This cut-off was set to reduce the possibility that 
any changes in mentalization could have taken place as a result of their treatment. 
At four weeks, most clients would still be in the process of becoming socialised to 
the CBT or DBT model, establishing and enhancing commitment to treatment and 
identifying goals or developing a formulation of their difficulties. 
Potential participants were approached by phone. The purpose and process of the 
study was explained and they were sent an information sheet with further details 
(Appendix D). Those interested in taking part booked an appointment to meet with 
the researcher at an NHS site.  
At this appointment written informed consent was obtained from all participants 
(Appendix E).  Participants then completed the BEST. 
Fonagy and Luyten (2009) proposed that it is when the attachment system is 
activated that mentalizing is lost in individuals with BPD, leading to the re-
emergence of pre-mentalistic modes of processing experiences. They suggested 
that this can be achieved experimentally through collecting Adult Attachment 
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Interview (AAI; Main and Goldwyn, 1998) narratives. The AAI is a semi-structured 
interview that accesses thoughts, feelings and memories about attachment 
experiences to assess current mental representations of these. In order to activate 
the attachment system participants in this study were therefore asked questions 
from the AAI that encouraged them to reflect on their relationships growing up:  
a. I’d like you to try to describe your relationship with your parents as a 
young child. If you start as far back as you can remember… 
b. Did you ever feel rejected as a young child? Of course looking back 
on it now you may realise that it wasn’t rejection, but what I’m trying 
to ask about is whether you remember ever having felt rejected? 
This method has been used in previous doctoral research.  
The battery of mentalization tasks was then completed. These were presented in a 
counterbalanced order, to counteract any sequence or order effects.  
The session took between one and two hours on average. Participants received £10 
for their time plus travel expenses. 
Joint project 
In order to maximise recruitment and reduce participant fatigue, this study was 
conducted alongside another project conducted by a trainee clinical psychologist, 
investigating the effects of therapy on self-compassion in the same population 
(Perera, 2012). Participants therefore also completed questionnaires relating to self-
compassion before the mentalizing tasks were presented (see Appendix F for 
details).  
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Sample size and statistical power 
Cohen’s Power Primer tables (Cohen, 1992) recommended that for correlational 
analyses a sample size of 67 is required to detect a medium effect size, and 30 to 
detect a large effect size, at  α=5% and power = 80%. Unfortunately, given time 
limitations and difficulties in recruiting this population, the achieved sample size in 
this study was 25.  
Data analysis 
Participants’ scores on the BEST, MASC and RMET were manually entered into an 
SPSS 20 database along with demographic information and outcomes from the 
SCID-II and THI which were provided by their therapists. CPTT results were 
automatically collected in E-Prime and then transferred to the SPSS database. A 
CPTT experimental error variable was calculated through dividing the difference in 
incorrect responses on director experimental tasks (requiring mentalizing) and 
director control tasks by the total number of incorrect responses in director trials 
([Director Experimental Errors – Director Control Errors]/[Director Experimental 
Errors + Director Control Errors]) . This index, previously used by Newbury-Helps 
(2011), reduces the chance of results being confounded by extraneous variables 
such as individuals’ visuospatial ability, processing speed and confidence and 
experience in using computers.  
All variables were checked for normality using histograms and the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. After removing three outliers from the data (more than three standard 
deviations away from the mean), this revealed the CPTT experimental error (z = 
.272, p<.01) and scores on two subscales of the MASC to violate the assumptions 
of normality: insufficient mentalizing (z = .191, p = .024) and no mentalizing (z = 
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.217, p = .004). Non-parametric statistics were therefore used when exploring these 
variables. 
Hypotheses were tested using correlational analyses and independent samples t-
tests or Mann-Whitney U tests comparing the results of this study from those of the 
sample tested in the study of Newbury-Helps’ (2011), looking at mentalizing in 
individuals with a diagnosis of ASPD (n=82). 
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Results 
Table 1 presents the demographic profile of participants. The sample had a mean 
age of 34.76 years (SD = 12.18) ranging from 19 - 54. The majority of participants 
were female (84%) and White British (68%). Correlations revealed no significant 
association between age and scores on any of the tasks employed in this study. 
This suggests that age is not a confounding factor in the results below. Given the 
size of the gender and ethnicity groups it was not possible to accurately test for the 
impact of these factors on performance in mentalizing tasks.  
Table 1. Demographic information. 
 n 
(N=25) 
% 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
 
Age Group 
18 – 25 
26 – 35 
36 – 45 
46 – 55 
56 – 65 
 
 
21 
4 
 
 
9 
4 
5 
7 
0 
 
84 
16 
 
 
36 
16 
20 
28 
0  
Ethnicity 
White British 
Asian 
African-Caribbean  
Mixed 
White Other 
 
17 
1 
1 
2 
4 
 
68 
4 
4 
8 
16 
 
Pre-hypothesis testing 
If mentalizing ability is related to symptom severity in BPD it is necessary that the 
performance of this sample is below that achieved by healthy controls. To confirm 
this, the results from this study were compared to those from the control groups 
tested in the original studies employing each of the mentalization tasks (Table 2). 
This comparison revealed that healthy controls outperformed the current sample in 
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both the MASC (t(42) = 3.43, p<.01) and the RMET (t(111) = 1.99, p = .05). Of 
mistakes made in the MASC, 48.9% revealed excessive mentalizing, 36.8% 
insufficient mentalizing, and 14.3% no mentalizing. In the CPTT, the current sample 
performed less accurately than adults in Dumontheil, Apperly, and Blakemore’s 
(2010) study.  
Table 2. Comparison of performance in this study and in the original healthy control 
groups. 
 This Study Original Study* 
CPPT  
Director Control Error 
Director Experimental Error 
No Director Control Error 
No Director Experimental Error 
11% 1% 
72% 45% 
6% 
42% 
2% 
8% 
MASC   
Total Correct 31.0 34.8 
 (4.3) (2.7) 
RMET  
Correct  24.5 
(4.3) 
26.2 
(3.6) 
Note. Standard Deviations appear in parentheses below means where available. 
* CPTT: average percentage errors in Control and Experimental trials in the Director 
and No Director conditions for adults (N=36) from Dumontheil, Apperly, and 
Blakemore (2010)  
MASC: performance of the control group (N=20) from Dziobek et al. (2006) 
RMET: performance of general population controls (N=88) from Baron-Cohen et al. 
(2001) 
 
Hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis 1: BPD severity will correlate negatively with scores on tasks measuring 
mentalizing ability 
A bivariate correlation was conducted to test this hypothesis, the results of which are 
presented in Table 3. No significant correlations were found between scores on the 
BEST and performance on any mentalizing task. 
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Table 3. Correlations between BEST scores and performance on mentalization 
tasks. 
  BEST Scores 
CPPT  
Experimental 
Error 
Correlation -.22 
Sig.(2-tailed) .15 
N 25 
MASC   
Total Correct Correlation -.35 
 Sig.(2-tailed) .10 
 N 
 
24 
Feelings Correlation -.02 
Correct Sig.(2-tailed) .91 
 N 
 
25 
Cognitions Correlation -.26 
Correct Sig.(2-tailed) .22 
 N 
 
24 
Excessive 
Mentalizing 
Correlation .28 
Sig.(2-tailed) .17 
 N 
 
25 
Insufficient Correlation .09 
Mentalizing Sig.(2-tailed) .56 
 N 
 
24 
No Correlation .21 
Mentalizing Sig.(2-tailed) .17 
 N 25 
RMET  
Correct  Correlation -.21 
 Sig.(2-tailed) .32 
 N 25 
Pearson’s Correlation was used for all mentalizing variables except CPPT 
Experimental Error, MASC Insufficient Mentalizing and MASC No Mentalizing where 
Kendall’s non-parametric correlation was used. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be similarities in performance on mentalizing tasks across 
the BPD sample and an ASPD sample 
To compare mentalizing performance between this sample and Newbury-Helps’ 
(2011) ASPD population (n=82), independent samples t-tests and Mann-Whitney U 
tests were conducted. The results of these are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The 
current sample significantly outperformed those diagnosed with ASPD on the MASC 
(t(54.85) = 2.89, p = .005), particularly in identifying characters’ cognitions (t(52.32) 
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= 3.09, p = .003). Results also reveal that on this task the ASPD sample selected 
more responses demonstrating insufficient mentalizing (U = 679.00, p = .025) and 
no mentalizing (U = 687.00, p = .015). The BPD sample further outperformed the 
ASPD sample in the RMET (t(104) = 2.06, p = .042).  
Table 4. Independent samples t-tests comparing performance on mentalizing tasks 
across BPD(n=25) and ASPD (n=82) samples. 
 Diagnosis    
 BPD ASPD t df Sig.(2-tailed) 
MASC      
Total Correct 31.04 27.77 2.89 54.85 .005** 
   (4.35)  (6.34)    
      
Feelings 11.36 10.85 .91 104 .367 
Correct (2.00) (2.58)    
      
Cognitions 19.54 17.01 3.09 52.32 .003** 
Correct (3.19) (4.46)    
      
Excessive 
Mentalizing 
7.12 7.11 .01 104 .989 
  (3.44) (3.56)    
RMET 
Correct  
 
24.48 
(4.34) 
 
21.86 
(5.86) 
 
2.06 
 
104 
 
.042* 
Note. * = p<.05. ** = p<.01. Standard Deviations appear in parentheses below 
means. 
Equal variances assumed except MASC Total Correct and MASC Cognitions 
Correct where Levene’s test for equality of variances was significant, p < .05. 
 
Table 5. Mann-Whitney U tests comparing performance on mentalizing tasks across 
BPD (n=25) and ASPD (n=82) samples. 
     
   Mean 
rank  
U Sig.(2-tailed) 
CPTT 
Experimental 
Error 
 
BPD 
ASPD 
  
46.56 
55.64 
 
839.00 
 
.162 
   
MASC      
      
Insufficient BPD  40.79 679.00 .025* 
Mentalizing ASPD  56.62   
      
No 
Mentalizing 
BPD 
ASPD 
 40.48 
57.52 
687.00 
 
.015* 
 
Note. * = p<.05.  
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Post hoc analyses 
As part of their assessment for the service, participants completed the SCID-II and 
THI. These measures determine the BPD DSM-IV criteria met by each participant, 
the personality disorders they met diagnostic criteria for and the number of years of 
psychological treatment they had previously received. These details are presented 
in Table 6. The majority of participants met seven of the nine DSM-IV criteria for 
BPD, all demonstrating impulsivity, affective instability and suicidal behaviours, and 
all but one presenting with a pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal 
relationships. 92% of participants had diagnoses of comorbid personality disorders. 
44% of the sample had a diagnosis of Avoidant Personality Disorder, and 28% a 
diagnosis of Histrionic Personality Disorder. Participants had received a mean of 
2.14 years of psychological treatment (SD = 2.01), ranging from no history of 
therapy to 8 years in treatment.  
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Table 6. Assessment outcomes. 
 n 
(N=25) 
% 
Number of BPD criteria 
met 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
 
 
 
1 
6 
11 
5 
2 
 
 
4 
24 
44 
20 
8 
Number of personality 
disorder diagnoses 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
 
2 
15 
7 
1 
 
 
8 
60 
28 
4 
 
 
  
Number of years 
previously in 
psychological treatment 
None 
0 – 2 
2 – 4 
4 – 6 
6 – 8 
 
 
 
6 
11 
5 
2 
1 
 
 
 
24 
44 
20 
8 
4 
 
Post hoc analyses explored the impact of these additional variables on participants’ 
performance in mentalizing tasks. 
Bivariate correlations revealed no significant associations between the number of 
BPD criteria participants met and their performance in mentalizing tasks. This is 
presented in Table 7.  
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Table 7. Correlations between the number of DSM-IV BPD criteria met and 
performance on mentalization tasks. 
  Number of BPD symptoms 
CPPT  
 Correlation .03 
Sig.(2-tailed) .88 
N 25 
MASC   
Total Correct Correlation .07 
 Sig.(2-tailed) .76 
 N 
 
24 
Feelings Correlation .21 
Correct Sig.(2-tailed) .31 
 N 
 
25 
Cognitions Correlation .07 
Correct Sig.(2-tailed) .76 
 N 
 
24 
Excessive  
Mentalizing 
Correlation .17 
Sig.(2-tailed) .41 
 N 
 
25 
Insufficient Correlation -.01 
Mentalizing Sig.(2-tailed) .96 
 N 
 
24 
No Correlation -.23 
Mentalizing Sig.(2-tailed) .17 
 N 25 
RMET  
Correct  Correlation -.10 
 Sig.(2-tailed) .63 
 N 25 
Pearson’s Correlation was used for all mentalizing variables except CPPT 
Experimental Error, MASC Insufficient Mentalizing and MASC No Mentalizing where 
Kendall’s non-parametric correlation was used. 
 
Investigating the association between number of personality disorder diagnoses and 
performance on the measures of mentalization revealed no significant relationships 
(Table 8). 
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Table 8. Correlations between the number of personality disorder diagnoses given 
and performance on mentalization tasks. 
  Number of personality disorder 
diagnoses 
CPPT  
 Correlation .03 
Sig.(2-tailed) .89 
N 25 
MASC   
Total Correct Correlation .23 
 Sig.(2-tailed) .29 
 N 
 
24 
Feelings Correlation .17 
Correct Sig.(2-tailed) .41 
 N 
 
25 
Cognitions Correlation .22 
Correct Sig.(2-tailed) .30 
 N 
 
24 
Excessive 
Mentalizing 
Correlation -.23 
Sig.(2-tailed) .27 
 N 
 
25 
Insufficient Correlation .03 
Mentalizing Sig.(2-tailed) .86 
 N 
 
24 
No Correlation -.02 
Mentalizing Sig.(2-tailed) .93 
 N 25 
RMET  
Correct  Correlation .35 
 Sig.(2-tailed) .09 
 N 25 
Pearson’s Correlation was used for all mentalizing variables except CPPT 
Experimental Error, MASC Insufficient Mentalizing and MASC No Mentalizing where 
Kendall’s non-parametric correlation was used. 
 
Exploring the impact of previous psychological treatment on mentalizing ability, a 
bivariate correlation was conducted to investigate the relationship between number 
of years in treatment and performance on mentalization tasks. The results are 
presented in Table 9. No significant relationships were found.  
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Table 9. Correlations between the number of previous psychological treatments 
received and performance on mentalization tasks. 
  Number of psycholgcal treatments 
CPPT  
 Correlation .02 
Sig.(2-tailed) .92 
N 25 
MASC   
Total Correct Correlation .26 
 Sig.(2-tailed) .23 
 N 
 
24 
Feelings Correlation .23 
Correct Sig.(2-tailed) .27 
 N 
 
25 
Cognitions Correlation .18 
Correct Sig.(2-tailed) .41 
 
 
N 24 
Excessive 
Mentalizing 
Correlation -.03 
Sig.(2-tailed) .88 
 N 
 
25 
Insufficient Correlation -.26 
Mentalizing Sig.(2-tailed) .11 
 N 
 
24 
No Correlation -.20 
Mentalizing Sig.(2-tailed) .22 
 N 25 
RMET  
Correct  Correlation -.01 
 Sig.(2-tailed) .95 
 N 25 
Pearson’s Correlation was used for all mentalizing variables except CPPT 
Experimental Error, MASC Insufficient Mentalizing and MASC No Mentalizing where 
Kendall’s non-parametric correlation was used. 
Finally, mentalizing performance was compared between participants who had 
(n=19) and had not (n=6) received any previous psychological treatment. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test found that the CPTT experimental error (z = .317, p<.01) 
and no mentalizing subscale of the MASC (z = .307 p<.01) violated the assumptions 
of normality for the sample who had received treatment in the past. The Mann-
Whitney U test was therefore used to investigate these variables, otherwise 
independent samples t-tests were conducted to explore the differences between the 
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two samples. The results, presented in Tables 10 and 11, revealed some 
differences in the groups’ performance on the MASC. Participants who had received 
treatment in the past showed greater accuracy in identifying characters’ feelings 
(t(23) = 2.09, p = .048) and also gave less responses demonstrating non mentalizing 
(U = 25.00, p = .043).  
Table 10. Independent samples t-tests comparing performance on mentalizing tasks 
across participants who had and had not received previous treatment. 
  Previous No Previous    
 Treatment Treatment t Df Sig.(2-tailed) 
MASC      
Total Correct 31.72 29.00 1.35 22 .190 
  (4.31)   (4.15)    
      
Feelings 11.79 10.00 2.09 23 .048* 
Correct (1.99) (1.10)    
      
Cognitions 19.72 19.00 .47 22 .641 
Correct (3.06) (3.79)    
      
Excessive 
Mentalizing 
7.21 6.83 .23 23 .821 
  (3.47)  (3.66)    
 
Insufficient  
Mentalizing 
 
4.17 
(1.65) 
 
6.17 
(3.19) 
 
-1.47 
 
5.92 
 
.192 
RMET 
Correct  
 
24.00 
(4.36) 
 
26.00 
(4.29) 
 
-.98 
 
23 
 
.336 
Note. * = p<.05. Standard Deviations appear in parentheses below means. 
Equal variances assumed except MASC Insufficient Mentalizing where Levene’s 
test for equality of variances was significant, p < .05. 
 
Table 11. Mann-Whitney U tests comparing performance on mentalizing tasks 
across participants who had and had not received previous treatment. 
    
  Mean rank  U Sig.(2-tailed) 
CPTT 
Experimental 
Error 
 
Previous Treatment 
No Previous Treatment 
 
13.47 
11.50 
 
48.00 
 
.598 
  
MASC     
No 
Mentalizing 
Previous Treatment 
No Previous Treatment 
11.32 
18.33 
25.00 
 
.043* 
 
Note. * = p<.05.  
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Discussion 
This study aimed to explore mentalizing capacity in individuals with a diagnosis of 
BPD, hypothesising that difficulties in this ability would correlate with symptom 
severity. Contrary to this prediction, no correlation was found between symptom 
severity and performance on any of the tasks measuring different aspects of 
mentalizing ability. Further, in post hoc analyses neither the number of BPD 
symptoms participants were experiencing, nor the number of personality disorder 
diagnoses they had received, nor the time they had previously spent in 
psychological treatments, showed any relationship to their performance on the 
mentalizing tasks.  
It was also predicted that, in line with Paris’s (1997) contention that BPD is another 
manifestation of the psychopathology underlying ASPD, there would be similarities 
in mentalizing performance across samples with these diagnoses. This hypothesis 
was not supported by the data, which revealed significant differences in the 
performance of the BPD sample who took part in this study, and the ASPD sample 
recruited by Newbury-Helps (2011). Specifically, the BPD group outperformed the 
ASPD sample in the RMET and the MASC (particularly in questions regarding 
characters’ cognitions), selecting fewer answers that revealed insufficient 
mentalizing or no mentalizing at all.  
Hypothesis 1: BPD severity will correlate negatively with scores on tasks 
measuring mentalizing ability 
Although the current sample did perform less accurately on mentalizing tasks than 
healthy comparison groups from previous studies, no evidence was found for a 
relationship between mentalizing ability and BPD symptom severity.   
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There could be several explanations for this result. The first is that the negative 
finding is a type II error and that a relationship between mentalization and BPD 
symptom severity does exist but the study was too underpowered to detect this. 
The non-significant finding could also result from methodological limitations. It has 
been proposed that it is only when the attachment system is activated that 
impairments in mentalizing ability are revealed (Fonagy, & Luyten, 2009). If this 
switch from controlled to automatic processing had not occurred the extent of 
participants’ impairments in mentalizing might not have been accurately illustrated 
by the data collected. The AAI questions asked as part of the testing session were 
chosen due to their focus on important relationships and feelings of rejection as it 
was predicted that remembering these experiences and sharing them with another 
would lead to the reactivation of a fear of abandonment frequent in BPD, related to 
insecure attachment. There is a possibility however that the arousal experienced by 
participants in reflecting on these relationships was not great enough to activate the 
attachment system and, in turn, deactivate mentalization. Fonagy and Luyten (2009) 
explained that not everyone responds to such questions in the same way. While 
BPD was initially understood to be related to preoccupied attachment, characterised 
by feeling overwhelmed and confused by experiences, it has since been revealed 
that individuals diagnosed with BPD can also frequently be diagnosed with 
dismissing attachment (Levy, 2005). Individuals classified with this style of 
attachment use deactivation strategies when reflecting on attachment experiences, 
becoming dismissive and devaluing the importance of relationships, or conversely 
idealizing them, in an attempt to avoid the difficult emotions that thinking about these 
evokes. Fonagy and Luyten (2009) explained that these defenses ultimately fail 
under severe stress, but they do enable individuals to maintain controlled 
mentalizing for longer than those who instead protect themselves through a 
preoccupation with the availability of attachment figures. In this study, responses to 
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the MASC revealed both overmentalizing (comprising 48.9% of the errors made) 
and undermentalizing (36.8%) suggesting that participants were employing different 
strategies, possibly allowing some to maintain controlled mentalization throughout 
the tasks, masking links between symptom severity and mentalizing performance.   
Finally, there is the possibility that there is no relationship between mentalizing 
performance and severity of BPD symptoms, or that there is a relationship between 
these variables but of a different kind to that predicted. In Fonagy and Luyten’s 
(2009) model it is proposed that the symptoms experienced by those diagnosed with 
BPD are characterised by a low threshold for activation of the attachment system, 
and for deactivating controlled mentalization. It could be the case then that the 
severity of the disorder does not determine the severity of the mentalizing 
impairments, but rather contributes to where this threshold is set.  
Hypothesis 2: There will be similarities in performance on mentalizing tasks 
across the BPD sample and an ASPD sample 
This study revealed that the current BPD sample outperformed an ASPD sample 
(Newbury-Helps, 2011) in both the RMET and the MASC. In the latter task, they 
more accurately guessed characters’ cognitions, and made fewer errors revealing 
insufficient mentalizing or a lack of mentalizing.  
As discussed in the introduction to this paper, research investigating mentalizing in 
both of these populations has yielded inconsistent results. These could be 
understood however through looking specifically at deficits in particular aspects of 
mentalization. BPD was proposed to impact specifically on cognitive mentalization 
(Fonagy, & Luyten, 2009) while dissociations have been demonstrated in ASPD 
samples revealing limitations in affective but not cognitive domains of mentalizing 
(Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Aharon-Perets, & Levkovitz, 2010). This is in keeping with 
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the present results that those diagnosed with BPD illustrated greater accuracy in the 
RMET, a task which requires participants to infer emotional states using external 
cues. The finding that the BPD group also outperformed the ASPD group in correctly 
inferring characters’ cognitions in the MASC however contradicts this theory. 
A possible explanation for this could be the MASC’s superior ecological validity 
compared to other measures of mentalization (Preißler et al., 2006). The questions 
regarding thoughts and intentions in this task are very linked to characters’ 
emotions, as they would be in life. To accurately guess what Sandra is thinking 
when Michael presents her with a bunch of flowers for example, requires an 
understanding of her feelings towards Michael. Possibly this inextricable link 
between our thoughts and emotions is not represented so realistically in tasks 
assessing purely cognitive or affective aspects of mentalization.  
The BPD group were also revealed to give fewer responses to the MASC revealing 
undermentalizing or no mentalizing.  This supports the conclusions of a study by 
Sharp et al. (2011) who found a relationship between hypermentalizing and 
borderline traits in adolescents, but not undermentalizing or no mentalizing. They 
proposed that this capacity is not lost in times of emotional arousal, but rather 
undermined by hypermentalizing strategies.  
These results question Paris’s (1997) theory that both disorders stem from the same 
underlying psychopathology, suggesting that their symptoms could result instead 
from distinct impairments in mentalization, individuals with a diagnosis of BPD 
mentalizing excessively on the MASC, while those with a diagnosis of ASPD do not 
mentalize enough, or at all.   
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Post hoc analyses 
Post hoc analyses found a lack of a significant relationship between mentalizing 
performance and the number of BPD symptoms (a further measure of BPD severity) 
and the number of personality disorder diagnoses individuals had. As some 
participants had received psychological treatment for a number of years before 
being referred to this service, the relationship between the length of time in therapy 
and mentalizing performance was also investigated. Bateman and Fonagy (2004) 
suggested that regardless of orientation, therapists facilitate clients’ exploration of 
the mental states of themselves and others, labelling and mirroring feelings they 
don’t understand and providing an experience of seeing things from different 
perspectives. Given this argument it was hypothesised that the more treatment 
participants had received the better their performance would be in tasks requiring 
mentalizing. Although this prediction was not supported by the data, comparing 
performance across those who had not received any previous treatment and those 
who had, found that participants who had received therapy in the past were more 
accurate in identifying feelings in the MASC and were less likely to demonstrate 
non-mentalizing in their responses  These results need to be replicated in larger 
samples, and using within-subject designs, but tentatively suggest that, as Bateman 
and Fonagy proposed, therapy does foster mentalizing, those who had received 
therapy previously demonstrating a greater ability to reflect on mental states, 
particularly the emotions of others.  
The lack of relationships found between other variables could again be a result of 
the study lacking power, or of the methodological limitations described above. If the 
AAI questions did not sufficiently activate participants’ attachment system then 
responses would not reveal deficits in mentalizing but reflect differences in the use 
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of hyperactivating or deactivating strategies. Finally, it is possible that these factors 
do not impact on mentalizing deficits.  
Limitations 
As highlighted throughout, it is possible that the unexpected results found in this 
study were due to its sample size. The study was underpowered due to difficulties in 
recruitment and this increased the chance of a type II error.  
There are also limitations in the methodology used in the study. While the questions 
taken from the AAI were chosen in order to activate the attachment system there 
was no check in place to conclude that this was effective. This raised the possibility 
that participants maintained mentalization throughout the task, concealing deficits in 
mentalizing and therefore any relationship between this and symptom severity. 
Finally, it cannot be certain that the measures employed were not confounded by 
aspects of their design. The CPTT and RMET for example, while enabling the 
isolation of specific dimensions of mentalization do so at the expense of ecological 
validity. And the MASC, while approximating real life situations more accurately, 
risks losing important information regarding participants’ mentalizing through its 
multiple choice format. It is also flawed practically, the movie’s dubbing possibly 
preventing immersion in the film and impacting on participants’ ability to imagine 
what the characters think and feel. 
Research implications 
Redressing these limitations, future research employing larger sample sizes is 
necessary to confirm or question the results found in this study, and to further 
explore the relationship between BPD and mentalizing capacity.  
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It is also recommended that the link between attachment style and impairments in 
mentalizing are investigated. It is possible that differences between the strategies 
participants used when reflecting on early attachment experiences masked 
differences in mentalization, leading to the non-significant results found in this study. 
Performance in these tasks for example could be compared with measures of 
attachment style, such as the AAI, to determine whether this factor, more than 
symptom severity, influences the severity of impairments on mentalizing 
performance. Or more simply a measure of emotional arousal, even a scaling 
question asking participants to rate their emotional state, before presenting the 
mentalization tasks could be used to assess the impact this has on accurately 
representing others’ affective and cognitive states.  
This study, although underpowered, found a significant difference in the mentalizing 
profiles of samples diagnosed with ASPD and BPD. This is an original finding that 
has not been reported in previous research and it is recommended that this 
difference is explored further using larger sample sizes, and controlling for possible 
confounds in these results, such as gender and socioeconomic differences.  
Mentalization is a difficult construct both to define and to measure, and future 
research into developing valid tools to assess this capacity would be invaluable to 
our understanding of the role of mentalizing in personality disorder and its treatment. 
In teasing apart the differences in mentalization deficits between disorders such as 
BPD and ASPD it would be helpful for more measures to be developed or adapted 
that, like the MASC, allow inaccuracies to be categorized as stemming from 
hypermentalization, insufficient mentalization or from mind blindness. Mentalizing 
can fail for different reasons and tools measuring this capacity need to reflect this. 
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It can be concluded however that this battery of tasks is feasible for use with this 
population, as no complaints were received and no participants withdrew consent 
during or following testing or requested for their data to be withdrawn from the study. 
Clinical implications 
Bateman and Fonagy (2010) highlighted how successful treatment for BPD requires 
clients to maintain ‘an optimal level of arousal’ in sessions. This means that they are 
neither too detached from their feelings to be able to explore or process these, nor 
too overwhelmed by these to think.  They developed general principles for therapists 
to follow in deciding which interventions to use in different situations, suggesting that 
the intensity of the intervention should be inversely related to the intensity of the 
emotional arousal the client is experiencing. 
While results from this study reveal that clients with a diagnosis of BPD most 
commonly misread mental states through hypermentalizing, 36.8% of the inaccurate 
responses given in the MASC were as a result of undermentalizing. This suggests 
that clients with this diagnosis do not only use hyperactivating but deactivating 
strategies to avoid experiencing difficult and painful emotions. Connors (1997) 
recommended that in treating clients who have learned to respond in this way to 
closeness it is important first to develop an alliance through discussing less 
threatening topics, avoiding using relational terms and focussing on concrete 
problems. So where a dismissive attachment style in demonstrated, less intense 
interventions are required even though arousal may appear low, in order for clients 
to feel safe enough to express these emotions. It is important that clinicians remain 
aware of this when introducing interventions to achieve the optimal level of arousal 
in sessions. 
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The differences revealed between the BPD and ASPD sample suggest that the 
mentalizing impairments underlying the two disorders are distinct. If this finding can 
be replicated it could promote the use of different strategies in MBT for BPD and 
ASPD, The finding that the current sample made less errors reflecting insufficient 
mentalizing for example supports the theory that mentalization is not lost in clients 
with BPD but is altered through hyperactivating strategies. If this is the case then it 
may be more appropriate that therapy for BPD focuses on enabling clients to ‘relax 
mentalization’ (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008, p.39) rather than trying to foster 
mentalization per se which would be of more therapeutic value for clients with a 
diagnosis of ASPD.  
Conclusions 
In conclusion, this study revealed no association between mentalizing performance 
and severity of BPD symptoms. The study was underpowered, thus requires 
replication using larger sample sizes, but promotes further investigation of the link 
between BPD, mentalizing and emotional arousal.  
Results also revealed enhanced performance in mentalizing tasks compared with a 
sample of individuals diagnosed with ASPD, suggesting that BPD is characterised 
not by a loss of mentalization but through hypermentalizing strategies in response to 
emotional arousal. This finding again needs to be confirmed through future 
research.  
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Introduction 
This appraisal examines my experience of the process of developing and 
conducting my major research project. It reflects first on what motivated me to study 
mentalization, and then, in line with the limitations highlighted in my empirical paper, 
it focuses on the issues I faced in accurately measuring this concept, the difficulties I 
encountered in recruiting a hard to reach population, and my experience of asking 
participants to reflect on difficult experiences in early attachment relationships. Each 
of these sections concludes with suggestions for further research given these 
limitations. I hope that others might find my reflections on these practical and 
personal challenges helpful when embarking on their own research.   
Background context 
Working before the course as a support worker in a complex needs recovery 
service, I discovered a passion for helping clients with a diagnosis of borderline 
personality disorder (BPD) to understand their experiences and work towards 
recovery. My time there gave me an invaluable insight into the experiences of 
individuals with this diagnosis and those who care for them, which has had a 
profound influence on my work, both direct and indirect. I actively sought 
opportunities to work with this population throughout my training and felt privileged 
to be given the opportunity to conduct a piece of research that could help gain a 
better understanding of the disorder and its treatment.  
I have always been particularly interested in attachment (Bowlby, 1969), and how 
our early experiences of relationships can shape our lives, guiding our feelings, 
expectations and beliefs about others and ourselves. I also share Bowlby’s (1988) 
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view that one of our roles as a therapist is to provide a secure base for clients, 
perhaps the first they have ever known, and to offer corrective emotional 
experiences that can help them develop trust in themselves and others. When my 
supervisor introduced the concept of mentalization (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009) to me I 
found it fascinating. It was a way of understanding the impact of early relationships 
on later life and also how secure attachment within the therapeutic relationship could 
improve treatment outcome. I was excited to be able to contribute to our 
understanding of its relationship to BPD.  
Measuring mentalizing 
Choosing measures 
The first thing to decide upon was how to measure mentalizing. Traditionally this has 
been measured using the Reflective Functioning (RF) Scale. RF (Fonagy et al., 
1995) is an operationalization of the capacity to mentalize within the context of an 
attachment relationship. It is measured by coding Adult Attachment Interview 
narratives (AAI: Main and Goldwyn, 1998), looking at the thinking revealed by 
interviewees about their own and others’ mental states, as part of understanding 
their experiences within attachment relationships.  As I learned about this measure 
however I realised that it would not be practical to administer as part of this project 
given that it is not only very time-consuming but also requires considerable training 
and the need for external validation of scoring. Further there were questions about 
its reliability and interpretive value which seemed particularly important given my 
research questions.  
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Choi-Kain and Gunderson (2008) highlighted a lack of empirical evidence of its test-
retest reliability and convergent and divergent validity, and further stated that its 
single score does not reflect the complexity and multidimensionality of the construct 
it measures. As they explained, a low score could equally represent a consistently 
superficial understanding of mental states or a highly variable capacity to mentalize. 
It is also possible that its score only represents capacity in certain domains of 
mentalization which is not a unitary ability. It has been proposed that individuals 
diagnosed with BPD only demonstrate impairments in tasks requiring specific 
aspects of mentalizing; in other areas their performance has been found superior to 
that of healthy controls (Fonagy, & Luyten, 2009). It would therefore be impossible 
to reflect an individual’s capacity to mentalize in a single measure. To improve its 
measurement, Choi-Kain and Gunderson (2008) promoted the use of tasks that 
reflect these various dimensions. 
In answering a similar research question, investigating the relationship between 
difficulties in mentalizing and symptoms of antisocial personality disorder, a previous 
trainee (Newbury-Helps, 2011) used the Computerised Perspective Taking Task 
(CPTT; Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010), the Movie for the Assessment of 
Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006) and the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Task (RMET; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) to gain 
measures of the various facets of mentalizing ability.  
The CPTT is a recently developed measure of internal and cognitive aspects of 
mentalizing, requiring participants to inhibit their egocentric bias and take another’s 
perspective in order to complete a task. The task has two conditions, one where 
instructions to move different objects are given by a director, whose visual 
perspective must be considered in responding, and one with no director, where 
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participants are given the rule to ignore certain objects (those that would have been 
hidden from the director in the previous condition). The conditions are matched in all 
aspects except for the presence of the director so the difference in performance 
across the conditions can be ascribed only to participants’ ability to perspective take 
and not to confounding factors such as executive demands. Although the results of 
Dumontheil, Apperly and Blakemore’s (2010) study have yet to be replicated, their 
research presenting the task to 177 female participants aged between 7 and 27,  
revealed significant differences in performance  across condition (director/no-
director) (p < 0.001), trial type (control/experimental) (p < 0.001) and age (young 
children/older children/young adolescents/older adolescents/adults) (p < 0.001). 
This task therefore offered a measure of purely cognitive and internal mentalizing, a 
domain where clients with BPD have previously revealed impairment.    
The MASC requires participants to watch a film showing four characters meeting for 
a dinner and to answer questions about their thoughts, feelings and intentions. 
Several aspects of this measure made it an appropriate choice for this study. 
Primarily I was drawn to its ecological validity. In designing the MASC, Dziobek et al. 
(2006) wanted to develop a task that approximated real life interactions and the 
difficulties that individuals experience in social understanding. As in real life, 
participants are required to accurately interpret characters’ positively and negatively 
valenced thoughts, emotions and intentions through both verbal and non-verbal 
displays and to recognise and understand concepts such as first and second order 
false belief, persuasion, sarcasm and irony. The MASC further addressed the 
limitations of previous measures using film clips such as the Awkward Moment Test 
(Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 2000) through avoiding distracting stimuli 
such as music or additional characters, thus reducing information processing 
demands which could confound results. Asking questions immediately after 
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characters’ expressions or statements also minimises the impact of memory on 
performance. Dziobek et al.’s (2006) study successfully revealed that there were no 
significant between group effects of executive functions, attention, visual processing 
and memory, suggesting that these confounds are minimal in the task. Another 
unique feature of the MASC is that its scoring system allows you to not only assess 
whether a response is right or wrong, but whether the error showed insufficient 
mentalizing, a complete lack of mental state reasoning, or excessive interpretation. 
This allows for a more detailed understanding of what underlies participants’ 
difficulties in judging the mental states of others. The task has good test-retest 
reliability (intraclass correlation coefficient = 0.97) and has previously discriminated 
control groups from those with diagnoses of BPD (Preißler et al.,2010), Asperger’s 
Syndrome (Dziobek et al., 2006), euthymic bipolar disorder (Montag et al., 2010) 
and paranoid schizophrenia (Montag et al., 2011). 
Finally, given that the CPTT gives a measure of internal mentalization I felt it was 
important to also include a measure of external mentalizing in the battery. The 
RMET is a well-established task that measures this ability, requiring participants to 
infer the mental states of others from photographs of their eyes. The task has 
already successfully discriminated control groups from those with diagnoses of 
autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), BPD (Fertuck et al., 2009), depression (Lee, 
Harkness, Sabbagh, & Jacobson, 2005), schizophrenia (Craig, Hatton, Craig, & 
Pentall, 2004) and more.  
Overall ,therefore, I felt that these tasks would give a good impression of 
participants’ ‘mentalizing profile’ (Fonagy, Bateman, & Bateman, 2011, p.106). 
Practically the battery was also not too lengthy to be completed in a single session 
and when I ran the tests with friends and family they found the tasks interesting and 
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enjoyable. This was an important consideration given that I wanted the measures to 
be feasible for use within a clinical population. 
Administering the measures 
Surprisingly, administering the tasks I was struck most by the limitations of the 
MASC, despite previously feeling the most confident in this measure due to its 
ecological validity. A practical flaw with the task was the film’s dubbing. Although 
Dziobek et al. (2006) commented that participants did not refer to this or report it as 
an interference, participants in my study did refer to this asynchronicity between the 
voiceover and lip movements of the actors. I wondered how this might affect their 
ability to ‘imagine what the characters are feeling or thinking at the very moment the 
film is stopped’ as they are instructed. Studies have demonstrated that the 
emotional intensity of films can be lost where there is a mismatch between lip 
movements and speech, even when these are in the same language (Carter, 
Sharan, Trutoiu, Matthews, & Hodgins, 2010).  Pettit (2005) described how 
translations in themselves can tone down characters’ emotions. Roberts (2010) 
found that students experienced dubbing in films as unreal, fake and distracting, and 
reported that the lack of lip synchronization was disruptive, and Wissmath, Weibel 
and Groner (2009) suggest that this might prevent immersion. This could impact on 
the ability of participants to judge characters’ thoughts and feelings.  
I also felt that important information about participants’ mentalizing throughout the 
task was lost through the MASC’s scoring system. Bateman and Fonagy (2006) 
contend that ‘good mentalization’ requires an acceptance that we cannot know what 
other people are thinking, and an acknowledgement that situations will be 
understood differently by people depending on their previous experiences. 
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During the film many participants, despite giving incorrect answers, made comments 
on the characters’ actions and explained their reasoning to me in ways that 
demonstrated these traits, showing insight and sensitivity into the characters’ 
thoughts, feelings and intentions. They also expressed an understanding that people 
have different perspectives on situations, often telling me that ‘I know what I’d be 
thinking but I don’t know about her’. These displays of mentalizing capacity however 
are not reflected in scores which are deemed simply correct or incorrect.  
Dziobek et al. (2006) described how correct answers were determined through 
‘agreement between how the mental states were intended in the script and how the 
actual mental states were depicted by the characters’ (p.628) and by administering 
the test to 30 healthy controls to test for feasibility. However, given Bateman and 
Fonagy’s (2006) indicators of good mentalization, I wondered how valid it was to 
label responses in this way, understanding that we can never know what another 
person is thinking or feeling. In some questions I felt that the answers which 
demonstrated ‘excessive mentalizing’ were as plausible as those scored correct, 
particularly within the context of the story. Towards the end of the evening for 
example, during a game of carrom, Michael performs badly on his turn and Sandra, 
who finds Michael a show off, comments sarcastically that he is ‘a real pro!’ He 
subsequently throws his chip at the board, scattering the other pieces. Michael has 
made it clear previously that he is attracted to Sandra, and that he values her 
opinion, appearing upset when she ignored him during a conversation. When asked 
how Michael is feeling the ‘correct’ answer is that he is ‘frustrated about his bad 
performance’, however given Sandra’s response and his desire to impress her it 
seems likely that he could equally feel ‘angry at Sandra for humiliating him’.  
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It is perhaps inevitable that a task measuring mentalization with ecological validity 
raises these issues which are very much a part of interactions in the real world. 
Such limitations are not so prevalent in tasks like the RMET where mental states are 
implied using external features such as facial expressions, leaving less room for 
subjective interpretation than a focus on internal experiences which are by their 
nature ‘opaque’ (Bateman, & Fonagy, 2006). Similarly it is easier to know what 
another believes based on their physical perception (measured in the CPTT) or on 
information available to them, than to recognise and empathise with their feelings 
which are by definition subjective.  Barker, Pistrang and Elliott (2002) described how 
qualitative methods allow researchers to study concepts that ‘do not easily lend 
themselves to quantification’ (p.74) and I wonder if Dziobek et al.’s (2006) original 
version of the task, using an open answer format, may therefore be better suited to 
assessing these internal and affective domains of mentalizing. 
The RF Scale, in attempting to measure individuals’ capacity to think in terms of 
their own and others’ mental states, uses a scoring system to rate participants’ 
answers to open ended questions and I feel that developing a similar methodology 
for the MASC might yield a richer and more valid assessment of participants’ 
mentalizing profiles. The scale does not determine answers wrong or right but 
classifies RF according to evidence of qualities that suggest good mentalization in 
participants’ responses to questions. Bateman and Fonagy (2006) have also 
developed a more simplified checklist for assessing mentalization clinically, 
awarding points according to the evidence given of traits such as an 
acknowledgement of the opaqueness of other’s mental states, forgiveness, and an 
awareness of the impact of affect on people’s understanding of themselves and 
others. Dziobek et al.’s (2006) film, approximating real life, depicts situations where 
each of these would be important: it is necessary for example for participants to 
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recognise Betty’s ability to forgive Michael’s insensitive comments in order to 
correctly infer that she is warming towards him by the end of the night. Rating 
responses in this way still gives the opportunity to investigate whether answers 
reflect a lack of mentalization or conversely excessive mentalizing, as the RF scale 
does, identifying comments that are clichéd for example as revealing simplistic RF, 
and those that show greater depth than expected as over-analytical (Fonagy, 
Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998). This methodology would be more time intensive 
than the multiple choice version of the MASC and would require more than one 
researcher to assess transcripts in order to check inter-rater reliability, but I feel that 
the greater understanding of individuals’ mentalizing it would afford outweigh these 
limitations.  
Recruitment 
It was decided with my supervisor that we would recruit from clients recently 
accepting therapy in the specialist personality disorder service where she works as 
clinical lead. The service receives 20 new referrals per month and half of these go 
into treatment so assuming that half of these again would agree to participate we 
estimated that it would be feasible to recruit five participants per month, aiming for a 
sample size of 30. 
I made my first presentation to the team in early August 2011, describing my study 
to the service’s therapists and outlining the inclusion criteria. Despite initial interest it 
was a month until I received any names and another month until any clients agreed 
to take part in the study.  
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I encountered difficulties at every stage of the recruitment process. The first step 
was to gather names and phone numbers of clients who had recently been 
assessed for the service. Although I kept in regular contact with therapists via email 
and phone messages I received very few responses. My supervisor suggested that 
it might be helpful to visit team meetings more often, developing a relationship with 
staff members, however attending the meeting only resulted in receiving one more 
name. We recognised that it was a difficult time in the service which had very 
recently been restructured, and that understandably staff might not have the time or 
motivation to help in recruiting for studies. To improve this my supervisor made 
space in her supervision with staff to look through their caseloads for any clients 
who were appropriate for the study and we found that protecting this time and 
making it an agenda item in this way was the most effective way of gathering the 
details of individuals who might be interested in participating. 
At the next stage, calling clients, approximately half were interested in the study, as 
we had predicted. Some told me straight away that they did not want to participate, 
others asked me to phone back but then did not answer my calls and many simply 
never answered. I noticed that as more people declined to take part I was becoming 
anxious when I called clients to tell them about the study, worrying about how I was 
going to recruit enough participants to finish the project within the time limit. I was 
also disconcerted that I was beginning to feel like a salesperson, offering clients an 
opportunity that benefitted me more than them.   
My anxiety increased further when over half of the participants who had booked to 
attend testing sessions did not attend their appointment or cancelled on the day, 
often explaining that they were feeling overwhelmed by difficulties in their lives, 
mostly arguments with others. Participants were recruited having recently been 
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assessed at the service or within their first weeks of treatment. In this period 
symptoms are severe enough for clients to seek help and to receive a diagnosis of 
BPD, which is characterised by instability (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
They had also had little contact with the service, even those receiving therapy still 
being within the process of socialising to the cognitive behaviour therapy or 
dialectical behaviour therapy model and establishing or enhancing commitment to 
treatment. They were therefore unlikely to have developed an affiliation to the 
service that might motivate them to participate in a study there, or to attend once 
they had made an appointment. Some participants even expressed negative 
feelings towards the service, finding their therapy sessions upsetting and holding 
negative expectations about their treatment given difficult experiences in previous 
services. In hindsight I feel that I should have taken this into consideration when 
estimating the number of participants it would be feasible to recruit. 
I thought back to occasions on placement when I had experienced similar feelings of 
anxiety, an uncomfortable sense that I was encouraging people to do something 
they did not want to do and a growing hopelessness. I remembered how recognising 
and exploring these feelings and challenging the thoughts underlying them had 
enabled me to overcome difficulties in my therapeutic work. My feelings in this 
situation were driven by my beliefs that in order to complete the project on time I had 
to recruit everyone I spoke to and that I was annoying everyone by calling them and 
perhaps being selfish by asking them to take part in my study, especially at such a 
difficult time in their lives.  
Chadwick (2006) described how in therapy such beliefs and assumptions threaten 
relationships as therapist anxieties become played out interpersonally.  I reflected 
that this might equally apply to my project so I challenged the catastrophic thoughts I 
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had been struggling with. It clearly was not the case that I had to recruit everyone I 
called in order to finish the project; it was also an almost impossible goal I had set 
myself. I also recognised that I was not annoying everyone by calling.  Some clients 
probably were irritated by me phoning, but others were very eager to participate, 
and were grateful for the opportunity to help others experiencing similar difficulties. 
Remembering these positive responses to my work I was able to accept that 
recruiting clients to take part in this research was not a selfish thing to be doing, but 
felt as important for some individuals as it did to me.  
Reflecting on these experiences now I wonder if a self-selection bias may have 
influenced the results of this study. Those who attended sessions frequently 
described their wish to help others experiencing the same difficulties they have 
faced through contributing to our understanding of BPD. This compassion, and their 
demonstration of thoughtfulness about the emotional experience of others, could 
suggest that those who chose to participate had a greater mentalizing ability than 
those who did not.   
Given participants’ enthusiasm and their positive experiences of the testing sessions 
I wonder if further research studies could employ a pre-post design to explore the 
relationship between mentalizing and BPD symptoms. My project was originally 
designed as a longitudinal study, investigating changes in mentalizing over three 
months of treatment, hypothesizing that mentalization would improve over therapy 
and that enhancements in mentalizing ability would correlate with improvements in 
symptom severity. This became implausible given time constraints and recruiting 
difficulties, however I do think that this is a feasible design for future research that 
would contribute to our understanding of the role of mentalizing in treatment 
outcomes. Studies conducting t-tests also require slightly smaller sample sizes in 
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order to detect differences in means which would be advantageous given the 
difficulties in recruiting from this population. 
Even with a small N however there is still scope for valuable research into 
mentalization and its relation to BPD symptoms. Davidson, Livingstone, McArthur, 
Dickson and Gumley (2007) recruited a sample of just 10 individuals with BPD to 
investigate whether therapeutic change was mediated by changes in integrative 
complexity (IC). They explored this through coding for IC in transcripts from therapy 
sessions early and late in treatment, and I wonder if this could also be a plausible 
way of measuring mentalizing. As described above, the RF scale offers a framework 
for scoring individuals’ capacity to reflect on the internal states of others’ through 
their responses to questions relating to their attachment experiences. Bateman and 
Fonagy (2006) described however that mentalization can also be assessed through 
exploring more spontaneous discussion in therapy. They described for example how 
good and poor mentalizing can be revealed through participants’ discourse in 
response to therapists’ questions regarding their thoughts and feelings during 
interpersonal episodes such as an argument, their ideas about how the other person 
involved was feeling or thinking, their understanding of their actions and finally their 
ability to contemplate contradictory ideas about the other person’s internal state.  
Given that unstable interpersonal relationships and difficulty controlling anger are 
symptoms of BPD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) it could be assumed 
that such incidences might be prevalent in discussions during therapy. If so, possibly 
future research could employ Davidson et al.’s (2007) methodology, assessing 
mentalization using Bateman and Fonagy’s (2006) guidelines, from transcripts taken 
from a small samples’ early sessions and correlating these with their symptom 
severity.  
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Testing sessions 
The sessions themselves were the aspect of the research that I found most 
rewarding. I had assumed that conducting quantitative research would be quite 
impersonal but my experience was very different to this. Throughout testing 
participants were keen to share their experiences with me, their hopes and fears 
about the therapy they were about to embark on and also their thoughts on the 
tasks. The sessions felt collaborative and also beneficial for participants who often 
told me that they had valued being able to speak with me.  
Balancing the need to stay boundaried and follow my protocol with that of remaining 
warm and empathic during testing was something that came naturally, since in 
therapy too these qualities are vital in promoting the therapeutic relationship, which 
develops from the feelings of security that this provides (Davidson, 2008).  What I 
did find difficult however was asking participants questions to activate their 
attachment system. While I feel comfortable talking about relationships and 
rejections in a therapeutic context it felt hard to ask these questions not to formulate 
or to help participants to understand these experiences, but in order to conduct 
research. The events and difficult feelings they recounted and their openness in 
describing these was very moving and it felt insensitive to then ask them to 
complete tasks on the computer.  
Something I found helpful in managing my emotional response to testing was 
learning about other clinicians’ experiences of conducting research. Orb, Eisenhauer 
and Wynaden (2000), suggested that this discomfort arises from the sense of 
passivity clinicians experience in the unfamiliar role of researcher, being required to 
simply listen rather than offering any form of intervention. Brinkmann (2007) too 
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highlighted the importance of accepting that participants had consented to take part 
in research and not to engage in a therapy session. Smith’s (1999) reflections on 
researching within a vulnerable population, helped to reduce some of my concerns, 
particularly his assertion that ‘people who cannot tolerate thinking about a sensitive 
topic will not do so, and that participants are probably wiser than we think’ (p.361). 
This resonated with me as I completed more sessions and noticed the wide variation 
in how much participants would disclose to me about their past. It was also 
reassuring that many participants expressed that they found the session a positive 
experience, valuing the opportunity to speak about their lives and not reporting any 
distress in completing the tasks after sharing these memories.  
Noticeably however, while participants remembered very traumatic and distressing 
experiences and I found myself moved, they often told their stories in a surprisingly 
blank way. Ryle (1998) described how ‘unfeeling’ accounts can mask emotions that 
individuals fear they would be overwhelmed by and linking back to the non-
significant findings of the study, I wonder if this might suggest that participants 
employed deactivating strategies to defend against these frightening internal 
experiences, thereby increasing the threshold for activation of the attachment 
system. As highlighted in the discussion of the empirical paper, if participants 
maintained controlled mentalization throughout the tasks, any links between 
symptom severity and mentalizing performance could be masked.   
With greater sample sizes there is the possibility that different mentalizing profiles 
may have emerged depending on participants’ use of hyperactivating and 
deactivating strategies in response to reflecting on attachment experiences.  Future 
research could explore this idea and also investigate whether mentalizing 
impairments differ according to specific BPD symptoms. Features of BPD such as 
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anger and paranoia have been linked to attachment style in previous studies (eg. 
Critchfield, Levy, Clarkin, & Kernberg, 2008; MacBeth, Schwannaeur, & Gumley, 
2008) and it could be hypothesised that attachment style influences both these 
manifestations of BPD and mentalizing capacity. With a larger sample the current 
study could have begun to explore this prediction, as BPD symptoms were collected 
as part of participants’ assessment for the service, but group sizes would have been 
too small to draw any reliable conclusions.   
Further research could also investigate the development of measures of 
mentalization that in themselves promote the activation of the attachment system. 
The AAI achieves this through its focus on difficult events and feelings, so by 
introducing similar themes into tasks such as the MASC arousal could possibly be 
triggered without the need for pre-task questions. A measure developed by George 
and West (2001) presents drawings of attachment situations (such as a man 
standing beside a gravestone) to activate internal representations which can be 
revealed in individuals’ responses to the scenes. There is no reason why film should 
not also be successful in evoking these feelings. The MASC primarily features 
issues such as friendship and dating, but perhaps a stronger focus on more 
distressing subjects such as a loss through the break-up of a relationship or through 
bereavement could lead to greater emotional arousal throughout the task. These 
themes are touched upon during the movie but are not predominant in the story. 
Maybe expanding on these topics could offer a more accurate way of measuring 
mentalization deficits through recreating the emotional states in which these are 
revealed. 
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Conclusions 
Taking on the role of researcher was something that felt quite new to me as I began 
this project, but throughout the process I realised why psychologists are so well 
placed to conduct this work. The issues raised in this appraisal and the skills 
required to overcome them were surprisingly similar to those faced in clinical work, 
for example finding an approach which fits, balancing the need for empathy, 
containment and boundaries, and also the importance of self-care throughout the 
process which can feel overwhelming. 
If I were to conduct this research again I would make several methodological 
changes based upon these reflections. Primarily, I would explore further the 
possibility of employing a more open-ended measure as part of the battery of tasks, 
so that the rich information gained from sessions was not lost through rigid scoring 
systems. Given the difficulties in obtaining the sample size required for this project, I 
would also start to recruit participants earlier, giving myself more time for data 
collection. I would decide with the team how we could best integrate recruitment into 
their regular activities without adding to their workload, maybe making it an agenda 
item as part of their regular supervision or team meetings that they bring a list of all 
new clients they have assessed. Finally, with regards to the AAI, I would use a 
simple self-report measure of arousal to determine participants’ emotional state on 
undertaking the tasks, to explore the possibility that results were confounded by 
some participants maintaining controlled mentalization throughout the session.   
Completing this project is an experience which I have found challenging but also 
incredibly rewarding and humbling. I am very thankful to those who took the time to 
participate in this research to help others, and I look forward to continuing to 
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contribute towards clients’ recovery in this way through my work as a reflexive 
scientist-practitioner.   
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Appendix A: The Borderline Evaluation of Severity Over Time (Pfohl, Blum, & 
Zimmerman, 1997)  
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Appendix B: Instructions for the Computerised Perspective Taking Task 
(Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010) 
Instructions 
First Part 
 
This experiment is investigating people’s ability to follow instructions on the 
computer.  
 
Here is an example of what you will see [showing picture example].  
 
 
You will be presented with a grid with several objects located in the slots. The 
director, who is on the other side of the grid, will give you instructions on which 
objects to move and where to move them. As you can see, there are several 
covered slots. You are able to see the objects in these slots, but the director cannot.  
This is how things look for the director [show slide of the array from director’s point 
of view].  
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The director does not know what is behind the covered slots, so it will be important 
to take his point of view into account when you follow his instructions.  
 
[Go back to the first screen] For example you can see the sweets, and because this 
slot is not covered, [Go to the director’s point of view screen], the director can see 
the sweets too. 
 
[Go back to the first screen] Let’s do another one. You can see the pipe, but 
because this slot is covered, [Go to the director’s point of view screen], the director 
cannot see the pipe.  
 
[Go back to the first screen] Can you show me another object which the director 
cannot see? [Wait for a response] … Yes that’s right [Go to the director’s point of 
view screen], the director cannot see the watch/brush/syringe.  
 
[Go back to the first screen] Now can you show me an object that the director can 
see? [Wait for a response]…  [Go to the director’s point of view screen], yes that’s 
right the director can see the camera film/racing car/yellow car. 
 
[Repeat until it seems the child understands]. 
 
So remember, when you follow the director’s instructions, it’s important to take his 
point of view into account. 
 
Your task is to listen to the director’s instructions and then “move” the object by 
clicking the mouse pointer on the object and sliding it to the correct slot. You will 
always be asked to move the object by one slot, for example one slot to the right, or 
one slot to the left.  
 
The instructions given by the director should be taken from your point of view, [Go 
back to the first screen] so if the director asks you to move the scissors left for 
example, you need to move the scissors towards your left, i.e. this side. Can you 
see we wrote Left and Right on those pieces of paper? It is to help you.  
 
[Demonstrate example of moving person up]. 
 
Can you try? What should do if the directory says “move the sweets up” ? [Check 
that the child click and drag the mouse pointer correctly]. 
 
You should do this as quickly and as accurately as possible. When you click on 
them, the objects won’t actually move, but you should act and move the mouse as if 
they did.  
 
If for some reason you don’t respond quickly enough the experiment will move on 
automatically. If that happens, don’t worry – you should just respond to the next 
instruction and not try to catch up. 
129 
 
Second part 
 
Now you are going to do something similar to the task where you were moving 
objects earlier. This time the director is not going to be there anymore [showing 
picture example]. 
 
 
 
As you can see, several of the slots have dark grey backgrounds, whereas most of 
them are clear. You are going to hear instructions to move the objects. These 
instructions only refer to items in the clear slots. They do not refer to objects in the 
grey slots. So you have to ignore the objects in the grey slots. It will be important to 
take this into account when you follow the instructions. Can you show me a slot with 
a grey background?  [Let them answer] And a slot with a clear background? [Let 
them answer] Is it all clear ? [Show the next slide with relational trials]. 
 
 
 
If I said move the top truck right, what would you do ? [Check they do the correct 
thing and ignore the truck in the grey background. If not clear, explain again.] 
Great, now we’ll start this part of the experiment. 
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Appendix C: Letter of approval from NRES Committee London - East 
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Appendix D: Participant information sheet 
 
 
RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF CLINICAL,  
EDUCATIONAL AND HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
Version 4 (03/02/12) 
Researcher: Rachel Tolfree 
 
 Do difficulties in mentalizing correlate with severity of personality disorder? 
  
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether to 
take part, this sheet will give you some more information about why the study is 
being carried out, what you would be asked to do if you decide to take part, and how 
the study will be conducted.  Please take some time to read this sheet, and to 
discuss it with other people if you wish. You are also very welcome to ask me any 
further questions about the study, or if you find anything on this sheet unclear.  
 
Why is this study being done? 
Mentalization is our ability to think about the thoughts and feelings of ourselves and 
others. It is thought that the difficulties experienced by people diagnosed with a 
personality disorder, such as difficulties managing emotions and relationships, result 
from temporary problems in this ability. This study is being done to explore 
mentalizing in people diagnosed with a personality disorder. This will help us to gain 
a better understanding of personality disorder and its treatment.  
 
Why have you been invited to take part?   
You have been invited to take part in the study because you have a diagnosis of a 
personality disorder and have recently been assessed for treatment at IMPART. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. Taking part in the study is entirely voluntary. It is your choice whether or not you 
would like to participate. Deciding not to take part in the study will not affect the care 
you receive from services either now or in the future.  
 
132 
 
If you do decide to participate, you will be given this information sheet to keep, and 
you will later be asked to sign a consent form stating that you wish to take part. If 
you do give consent to take part in the study, you are still free to leave the study at 
any point, without giving a reason. This will not affect the care you are currently 
receiving, or will receive in the future. If you leave, any information that we have 
already collected from you will be destroyed.  
 
What will happen if I decide to take part? 
If you wish to take part in the study, then please ring me, Rachel Tolfree, on 07592 
308 565 and we can arrange a time to discuss the study in more detail and to 
complete the first session. Alternatively, if you prefer, you can ask the member of 
staff who gave you this information sheet to ring me and pass on your contact 
details. I can then contact you to arrange a convenient time to meet. At this meeting, 
you will meet myself or Samanthi Perera (another Trainee Clinical Psychologist who 
will be working with me on this study) and can ask any other questions you may 
have. You will then be asked to sign a consent form to say that you wish to take part 
in the study. 
 
In this session you will be asked to fill in a questionnaire on how you have been 
feeling and behaving over the past week. Then myself or Samanthi will ask you 
some questions about your relationships. After this you will be given three computer 
tasks. These involve watching videos, looking at photographs and puzzles and 
answering questions on these. All together the session should last approximately an 
hour and a half. No part of the sessions will be audio-recorded. The meeting will 
take place either at IMPART or where you are receiving therapy.  
 
No part of the study is compulsory, and it is not related to the care that you receive 
from your GP, hospital or other mental health professionals.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
Some people can find it upsetting to talk about their personal experiences.  
However, we will support you if you become upset. Your personal therapist will also 
be aware of your participation in the study and able to support you should you find 
discussing your experiences difficult. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You may find it interesting to complete these tasks and the information gathered 
during this study will also help to inform our understanding of treatment for 
personality disorder, which will hopefully be a step towards helping improve 
interventions in the future.   
 
Will I be paid for taking part in the study? 
As an acknowledgement of your time, we will be offering you £10 for their 
participation. 
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Who will know you are taking part in the study?  
We will inform your personal therapist and GP of your participation in this study, but 
information collected during all stages of the study will be kept strictly confidential. 
All information will only be viewed by members of the research team. However, if 
through the course of the study it was found that you are at immediate risk of harm 
to yourself or others, this information will be shared with your therapist and, if 
necessary, emergency services.  
 
Your consent form will be kept in a separate location from your questionnaire, 
ensuring that this remains anonymous. All data will be stored in secure locations 
and the results of your tasks will be recorded on computers or flash drives which are 
password protected. Any published data will also be entirely anonymous meaning 
individuals cannot be identified. 
 
The data from this study will be stored in accordance with the UCL and NHS Data 
Protection and Records Management policies. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results will be written up in the form of a report for review by University College 
London (UCL) as part of my Clinical Psychology Doctorate. This report will also be 
published in relevant journals outside UCL. As mentioned, you will not be identifiable 
from these results. On completion you will be sent a report of the study. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
Every care will be taken in the course of this study.  However, in the unlikely event 
that you are injured by taking part, compensation may be available.  
If you suspect that the injury is the result of the Sponsor’s (University College 
London) or the hospital's negligence then you may be able to claim 
compensation.  After discussing with your research doctor, please make the 
claim in writing to Dr. Janet Feigenbaum who is the Chief Investigator for the 
research and is based at University College London. The Chief Investigator will 
then pass the claim to the Sponsor’s Insurers, via the Sponsor’s office. You 
may have to bear the costs of the legal action initially, and you should consult a 
lawyer about this. 
 
Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have any concerns about any 
aspect of the way you have been approached or treated by members of staff or 
about any side effects (adverse events) you may have experienced due to your 
participation in the research, the normal National Health Service complaints 
mechanisms are available to you. Please ask your research doctor if you would 
like more information on this. Details can also be obtained from the Department 
of Health website: http://www.dh.gov.uk.  
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Who has reviewed this study? 
This study has been reviewed by the NRES Committee London - East. 
 
Contact Details  
If you wish to contact me to discuss any of the information further or any concerns 
you have about the study, then please do so by ringing me on 07592 308 565 or 
sending me an email at r.tolfree@nhs.net.  
 
If you feel that I have not addressed your questions adequately or if you have any 
concerns about my conduct, then please contact my supervisor Dr. Janet 
Feigenbaum (Strategic and Clinical Lead for Personality Disorder Services, North 
East London NHS Foundation Trust and Senior Lecturer, Research Department of 
Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, UCL) on 07957 919 961or by email at 
janet.feigenbaum@nhs.net. 
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to read this information sheet. 
 
Rachel Tolfree 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
 
Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology 
General Office, Room 436, 4th Floor 
1-19 Torrington Place, London, WC1E 7HB. 
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Appendix E: Consent form 
 
RESEARCH DEPARTMENT OF 
CLINICAL, EDUCATIONAL AND 
HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant Consent Form 
Version 3 (03/02/12) 
Researcher: Rachel Tolfree 
 
Do difficulties in mentalizing correlate with severity of personality disorder? 
 
Participant Identification Number:  
                     Please initial box 
1 I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for 
the above study. I have had the opportunity to think about the 
information provided, ask the researcher questions about the study, 
and have had satisfactory answers to these questions. 
  
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical 
care or legal rights being affected. I understand that if I withdraw from 
the study, all of the information I have provided will be removed by 
the researcher.  
  
3. I agree to my GP and personal therapist being made aware of my 
involvement in the study, but not the specific information I give. 
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4  I understand In accordance with current UCL Records Management 
Policy, research findings will need to be stored by UCL as sponsor for 
20 years after the research has finished. The UCL Records Office 
provides a service to UCL staff and maintains archived records in a 
safe and secure off site location. All activities are conducted in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act and UCL Data Protection 
Policy. Access to the data is strongly regulated and permissions to 
access the data are treated case by case. 
  
5.  I understand that the information that I provide will be included in the 
researcher’s doctoral thesis and will be published in a scientific 
journal. I understand that all information included will be anonymised 
to protect my identity. 
  
6.  I give my consent to take part in the above study. 
 
 
     
Name of Participant   Date  Signature 
     
     
Researcher  Date  Signature  
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Appendix F: Joint project contributions 
 
This thesis was conducted as a joint project with Samanthi Perera, another trainee 
clinical psychologist supervised by Dr Janet Feigenbaum. Samanthi’s thesis 
explored ‘The Effect of Therapy on Self-Compassion’ (Perera, 2012).  
While we recruited and conducted test sessions together, our projects investigated 
different hypotheses and employed different measures. We entered and analysed 
our data separately and wrote our empirical papers independently.  
 
 
 
